After Osama: China?

May 10, 2011 · By John Feffer

In the war between the United States and al-Qaeda, the big winner is: China.

If the killing of Osama bin Laden were a Hollywood murder mystery, the shootout scene in Abbottabad would be followed by the unveiling of the sponsor who arranged for the al-Qaeda safe house. Is it the Pakistani intelligence officer who appears early in the movie to assure his U.S. counterparts that he is fully committed to bringing bin Laden to justice? Is it the Saudi construction magnate who owes several major favors to the bin Laden family? Or perhaps it's the U.S. embassy official who, it might turn out, believes that Osama is more useful alive than dead — until finally, he is useful no longer.

Who could possibly benefit from the care and feeding of the al-Qaeda legend? Audiences know to look for the suspect who benefits the most. The more intricate the conspiracy the better.

As the Navy SEALs dispose of bin Laden's body at sea, we follow the simultaneous action in Islamabad where bin Laden's secret sponsor is sitting in an office, back turned to the camera, passing over a final payment to the safe house owner. The music builds. It's hard to pinpoint the sponsor's accent. And then the camera pulls back and we realize that the action is taking place in an embassy. The flag on the wall, the sentries posted out front, and finally the placard with the embassy's name: The People's Republic of China.

Of course, bin Laden's death was not a Hollywood movie, however much the Obama administration presented it as such (the brave soldiers, the cowardly villain, the suspenseful hunt). And China has no love for al-Qaeda, particularly given its own battles against alleged terrorists in Xinjiang and elsewhere.

But perhaps the only country in the world that has benefited from the last decade of war against al-Qaeda is China, and it has benefitted big time. Beijing has watched the United States spend more than $3 trillion on the war on terrorism, devote its military resources to the Middle East, and neglect pretty much every other part of the globe (except where al-Qaeda and its friends hang out). The United States is now mired in debt, stuck in a recession, and paralyzed by partisan politics.

Over that same period, meanwhile, China has quickly become the second largest economy in the world. In 2001, Goldman Sachs predicted that the Chinese economy would rival that of Germany by 2011. Boy, was that a lowball estimate. Last month, the International Monetary Fund looked again into the crystal ball and announced that the Chinese economy would become the world's largest in 2016.

China's overtaking of the United States "will effectively end the 'Age of America' a decade before most analysts had expected," writes David Gardner in the British Daily Mail. "It means that whoever wins the 2012 presidential election will have the dubious honor of presiding over the fall of the United States." 

Memo from Beijing: Mission Accomplished!

Naturally, since this is no movie, it's not so cut and dried. As demonstrated by its huge investments into this country – including $45 billion worth of deals back in January – China doesn't want a bankrupt United States. Indeed, U.S. budget deficits and low interest rates have fueled global inflation, driving up food prices and creating precisely the kind of instability that makes China uncomfortable. Beijing needs American consumers, the relative security of American bonds, and the occasional stability provided by American troops. But remember: all of that can be provided by the world's second leading economy and number one military spender.

The Obama administration is well aware of these trends. Indeed, as National Security Advisor Tom Donilon recently told Ryan Lizza of The New Yorker, the United States should be refocusing on Asia. "One of Donilon’s overriding beliefs, which Obama adopted as his own, was that America needed to rebuild its reputation, extricate itself from the Middle East and Afghanistan, and turn its attention toward Asia and China’s unchecked influence in the region. America was 'overweighted' in the former and 'underweighted' in the latter." Asia hands like Kurt Campbell, before he became the current assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, routinely castigated the George W. Bush administration for ignoring East Asia. But the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the hunt for bin Laden, the continuing drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen, and now the Arab Spring have all kept the focus away from China’s rapid rise.

Those in the Obama administration looking for a global reset of U.S. foreign policy are forced to adopt a posture of "strategic patience." This, of course, is also the official U.S. policy toward North Korea. Basically, Washington is waiting for North Korea to bend to economic and military pressure, though there is not much precedent for such a North Korean response. "Strategic patience" is really just a fancy way of describing a policy of neglect. The United States is largely ignoring North Korea and, relatively speaking, the rest of Asia as well while we engage in some more battles, kill a few more terrorists (and civilian bystanders), enforce a no-fly zone, and otherwise behave like a moth attracted to the Middle East flame.

The Obama administration's desire to shift focus to East Asia — and its current inability to do so — explains a lot. The administration soured relations with Japan and caused the downfall of one Japanese prime minister (so far) because of a refusal to cancel a military base relocation plan on Okinawa opposed by the vast majority of the island's residents. The administration has made little headway on North Korea's nuclear program, allowing a conservative South Korean administration to bring the region close to the brink of war (with North Korea cooperating with brinksmanship of its own).

It's not as if the United States is an indispensible power in Asia. Indonesia has taken the lead in trying to mediate the border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) continues to slog away at untangling the dispute over islands in the South China Sea. Japan and Russia are perfectly capable of clearing up their own conflict over the Kurile Islands.

And the notion that the United States has to balance China in the region in some old-fashioned Cold War sense is certainly not necessary. China is not about to gobble up the region, beginning with Taiwan as an expensive appetizer. Beijing has watched Washington suffer considerable indigestion when it bit off more than it could chew (and the rest of the world could stomach). Competitive eating is not unknown in the world of geopolitics — see Age of Colonialism — but China has so far shown a measure of restraint.

If the United States intends to refocus on East Asia only to screw it up royally in the same way we've made a mess of the Middle East, it would be in everyone's interest if we fail to reorient our policy. But the United States still could play a constructive role as a Pacific power. At the current bilateral summit here in Washington, the two countries are trading charges over human rights and the value of each other's currency. These are critical issues. But Washington and Beijing, as the two leading military spenders in the world, should also discuss how to restrain the global arms race. Agreeing to a mutual code of conduct on arms trade and development issues would be valuable as well. And the Obama administration could help kick-start the Six-Party Talks, with China's help, so that we don't have to deal with the anomaly of North Korea, the world's only starving nuclear power.

The Osama bin Laden Era is over, and with it will end the Age of America. Here's one sign of the transformation: a child in Shanghai, writes Nicholas Kristof in a sobering op-ed, will now statistically outlive a child in the United States. China remains corrupt, intermittently oppressive, and subject to the same economic disparities and financial bubbles as the United States. But while we were fighting the chimera of a caliphate, China was going about its business and eating our lunch. 

Osama Continued

Last week, I quoted from my 2002 analysis of Osama bin Laden's secret strategy — to bankrupt the United States. Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF) columnist Walden Bello, in Osama's No Martyr, But the Man Prevailed, also dug up an essay he wrote in October 2001 that outlined the no-win situation that the Bush administration set up for itself.

If the United States "kills bin Laden, he becomes a martyr, a source of never-ending inspiration, especially to young Muslims," Bello wrote. "If it captures him alive, freeing him will become a massive focus of resistance that will prevent the imposition of capital punishment without triggering massive revolts throughout the Islamic world. If it fails to kill or capture him, he will secure an aura of invincibility, as somebody favored by God, and whose cause is therefore just…"

Perhaps now that Osama is gone, a very different kind of leader can emerge in the Arab world. "The Arab world has had its caliphs, sultans, and sheikhs, but it has not had a Voltaire," FPIF contributor Islam Qasem writes in Where Is the Arab Voltaire? "Never has the Arab world more urgently needed an Arab Voltaire who can break the false dichotomy between tradition and progress. This Arab Voltaire is not against public piety but speaks out for the separation between religion and state. His mission is to bring Arab society to the forefront of the 21st century without marginalizing its cultural values or its Islamic tradition and yet standing steadfastly against fanaticism, backwardness, and intolerance."

In our coverage of the killing of Osama bin Laden, FPIF has a wide variety of offerings: David Vine on the reaction of students at American University, Russ Wellen on the language of decapitation, Conn Hallinan on the implications for peace in Afghanistan, Laurence Hull on the generational response to the killing, Ian Williams on the impact on the U.S.-Israel relationship, and Stephen Zunes on the enduring grievances of bin Laden. And if you prefer to get your news from YouTube, here's a short interview with me about bin Laden, Pakistan, and U.S. foreign policy.

A case for 20 provinces

By Yasser Latif Hamdani
May 9, 2011 · 4:10 pmHow many provinces should Pakistan have and are the current provinces and provincial identities sacrosanct? There is no good reason to assume so.
Identity is always imagined and subjective. Administrative redistribution should not affect ethnic identity because there are Punjabis, Pushtoons, Sindhis, Baloch, Urdu speaking and other ethnicities living everywhere in Pakistan. However for the marginalised peoples of this multi-ethnic multi-cultural state of ours, administrative redistribution of provinces might actually be the best check against a tyrannical majority.
Post 18th Amendment, the time is opportune to divide Pakistan’s four provinces into as many as 20 with equal geographical area. Hypothetically speaking if Pakistan was to be divided into 20 provinces as aforesaid and each of these 20 provinces would have 5 senators in the upper house, the current Balochistan province would end up having twice as many senators as Punjab despite having one tenth of Punjab’s population. The senate can then be effective federal equipoise in the joint session of the parliament. The five senators- being indirectly elected from each provinces- can be made further representative of marginalised groups by including in them a mandatory religious minority and a woman. That way we can ensure representation and participation of not just all ethnic groups but of marginalised groups. After all we insist on being a confessional democracy, at the very least it ought to be a fair confessional democracy where gender and religion based identities can find justice and fair play.
There are other more tangible advantages. For example if the complaint of the Baloch people is lack of development and empowerment, the creation of up to eight or nine new provincial capitals instead of one will ensure genuine development at the grass roots level. In other existing provinces it will create new rival centers of power to Lahore, Karachi and Peshawar, all three of which will be better served by being converted into provinces. For the people of the far flung areas of Punjab, Sindh and Pakhtunkhwa – just like Balochistan – will experience real government at their door step.
This kind of provincial redistribution to empower backward areas or to gain political numbers for marginalised populations is not unprecedented. India has done it successfully. However for us there is another very important aspect that needs to be highlighted. Taking 4 provincial capitals for a Khaki usurper is very easy, especially when the army has garrisons in all four. Conquering 20 capitals will not be an easy task in the least, even for our mighty “mard-e-momins”. As a result continuation of democratic constitutional rule will be possible.
Similarly 20 provincial legislatures in the post 18th Amendment scenario would mean that the National Assembly would be more concerned with the job of law making instead of power politics of region and tribe. Many of the provisions of our lengthy and unwieldy constitution would make much more logical sense. The example of Article 158 comes readily to mind. Article 158 creates a priority for a province on a gas well head which is located in it. At the moment given the acute crisis in the country, centrifugal trends are exploiting this to deny a large mass of Pakistani population that lives in Punjab their share of the national gas resources. However in a scenario with smaller provinces, this constitutional provision would have real meaning and effectiveness.
In 1956 Pakistan made the crucial mistake of merging existing provinces into a single unit. What should have been done was that the then province of East Pakistan should have been divided along administrative lines. Not only would it have helped end much of the disparity, it would have ensured that Pakistan stayed united. Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.

Bin Laden Death Points to Way Out of Trap

Gilles Dorronsoro Bloomberg, May 3, 2011

Resources

The death of Osama bin Laden offers President Obama an opportunity to emphasize negotiations with the Taliban and escape the trap that is Afghanistan, but the impact on global terror and the threat from transnational jihadist groups will be limited.
Almost 10 years ago, when 3,000 people were killed on Sept. 11, Osama bin Laden set a snare for the U.S. His death on Sunday may not resolve all of the security challenges for the U.S., but it does offer a way out of the trap that is Afghanistan.
Any euphoria should be tempered by understanding that the impact on global terror will be limited and the U.S. is still under threat from transnational jihadist groups.
Here are four early lessons that must be taken into account:
Al-Qaeda hasn’t been significantly weakened.
Bin Laden wasn’t playing an active leadership role in the day-to-day operations of al-Qaeda and the group will probably transition smoothly and avoid any internal political struggles with Ayman al-Zawahiri as the obvious choice to assume command.
It is also important to remember that al-Qaeda is a decentralized outfit and there are new opportunities emerging in Yemen, Iraq and other countries to recruit fresh militants. Sure, al-Qaeda is under constant pressure and the threat is low, but there are many other important players to keep in mind. The Pakistani group Lashkar-e-Taiba, for instance, is more powerful than ever and also has a global agenda.
The impact might only be psychological, but there is no way to know if bin Laden’s demise will translate into more or less anti-American feelings in the Muslim world. Even with the Arab Spring, a change in the paradigm of Muslim public opinion in the Middle East and around the world seems unlikely for now.
Bin Laden’s death is of little importance to the war in Afghanistan.
Al-Qaeda has never been a major military force, especially compared with a local insurgency that has been able to mobilize tens of thousands of fighters. And contrary to what was expected in Washington, the surge of U.S. troops didn’t produce solid results. The Taliban is stronger than last year and more aggressive in pushing its advantage.
The number of attacks is historically high and the pressure is growing on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization coalition. Without conducting any major new offensive, the coalition is dealing with the same level of casualties this year as it was last year. With a diminishing presence in Afghanistan, the U.S. and its allies won’t be able to contain the insurgency or plan a transfer to the Afghan security forces.
Even more important, the transition process, which in principle should see the Afghan national army in charge of security by 2014, is unrealistic. Afghan units have low morale, aren’t autonomous and need air support and technology to cope with improvised explosive devices. The regime of Hamid Karzai is more corrupt and unpopular than ever and U.S. leverage on him is nil when it comes to governance.
The jihadist movements are back, especially in Nuristan and Kunar provinces, where the control of the coalition is nominal. Counterterrorism efforts alone are insufficient to deter these groups from using the Afghan border as a sanctuary.
Pakistan won’t make major changes, though Washington enjoys greater sway.
The real surprise in bin Laden’s death was the location --a two-hour drive from Islamabad, the capital, in Abbottabad, a military city. It’s unlikely that al-Qaeda, given the fact that it has repeatedly targeted the Pakistani military, was protected by Pakistani generals. But questions should be asked about lower-level complicity in Pakistan’s spy service, Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI.
The successful operation on bin Laden’s mansion does give President Barack Obama greater leverage to push Pakistan to take action on militant groups inside its borders. But the support given by Pakistan to the Afghan Taliban isn’t going to stop. Nor does bin Laden’s death alter plans by the Pakistani generals who envision a strategy of pushing out the U.S. -- while keeping India off-balance -- and turning Afghanistan into Pakistan’s own backyard.
Obama has a chance to push for negotiations with the Taliban.
While bin Laden’s death doesn’t win the U.S. a military advantage on the ground in Afghanistan, it makes a negotiated settlement easier. Obama -- at least for a short time -- will be free of Republican criticism on issues of national security and able to take more risks on the diplomatic front without accusations of being weak.
Since the current strategy isn’t working and the public support for the war is vanishing, Obama now has an opportunity to put more emphasis on negotiations with the Taliban’s leadership. The elimination of bin Laden as a symbolic figure will facilitate the negotiations on both sides, since he has been criticized by nationalist Taliban leaders in the past as a danger for the survival of their movement.
Nothing guarantees that negotiations will work because this will depend largely on the attitude of the Pakistani military, which enjoys control over the Taliban’s leadership. But the alternative is a strategic dead end and it will become obvious next year that the coalition finds it can’t withdraw without a rapid disintegration of the Karzai regime and a military victory for the Taliban.
Bin Laden’s death gives the U.S. the unique opportunity to get out of the Afghan trap. Let’s hope the Obama administration doesn’t miss the chance.

Bin Laden and the Arab Spring

Marwan Muasher Q&A, May 5, 2011

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The killing of the most-wanted man in global terrorism came amid a wave of upheaval sweeping across the Arab world. While it is too early to tell how Osama bin Laden’s demise will impact al-Qaeda, it is clear that it is a new Middle East.

In a Q&A, Marwan Muasher analyzes extremism in the Arab world and the implications of bin Laden’s death for the changing region and the West. Muasher argues that the ideology of violence and terrorism has peaked and is visibly on the way down, but the war on al-Qaeda and terror is far from over. The United States needs to rethink its previous strategy and strongly support political reform that runs counter to the extremism bin Laden preached.     

• What is the significance of Osama bin Laden’s death?
• How has bin Laden’s sudden demise been perceived across the region?
• How have the uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa influenced al-Qaeda?
• What is the current state of extremism in the Arab world? Is extremism on the rise?
• Will the successful raid on bin Laden’s hiding spot change the perception of the United States in the region? What should the United States do next?

What is the significance of Osama bin Laden’s death?

Osama bin Laden’s killing should be seen as a psychological victory. Bin Laden’s success in evading capture for nearly ten years after 9/11 dismayed Americans and the international community, and his death brings a great deal of understandable relief. 

But this doesn’t mean that al-Qaeda is finished. It is a decentralized organization—while many affiliates voiced allegiance to bin Laden, they do not rely on centralized direction and operate largely on their own. Splinter groups formed in the Arab world—from Iraq to Yemen to Morocco—and remain a distinct threat to the region and the West. 

With this in mind, bin Laden’s end in no way spells the end of the war on al-Qaeda and terror. 

How has bin Laden’s sudden demise been perceived across the region?

The majority of the Arab world welcomed bin Laden’s death, as he was largely seen as a terrorist. While there is inarguably a small minority that saw him in a positive light because he stood up to America, the simple fact is that he killed more Muslims than anyone else—and this was widely acknowledged in the region. 

During his life, bin Laden was able to exploit grievances and recruit militants who were frustrated by the Arab-Israeli conflict and the poor conditions in their countries, particularly the lack of political rights and economic opportunities. Al-Qaeda, however, did not actually work to resolve the Arab-Israeli problem or improve the lives of people in the region, but directed terrorist activities that targeted both non-Muslims and Muslims alike. 

Bin Laden was not a leader of an organization just fighting the West—he basically took on the entire world. The attacks on September 11 were certainly the most spectacular of his terrorist activities, but in the end he killed more Muslims than any other religion, sect, or specific nationality combined.  

How have the uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa influenced al-Qaeda?

Bin Laden used the argument that violence was the only way to achieve his aims, but the peaceful uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa run contrary to al-Qaeda doctrine. The Arab Spring sends a strong signal against violence and bin Laden’s way of thinking. 

In mere months, Arabs have demonstrated—to themselves and to the entire world—that they can affect change through nonviolent efforts. I believe the recent uprisings will have an impact on Palestinians who will not sit still and accept the continuation of the Israeli occupation, but will increasingly rely on peaceful means to call for change.  

What is the current state of extremism in the Arab world? Is extremism on the rise?

It is important to remember that there is a distinction between an al-Qaeda organization that is far outside the mainstream of Islam and the overwhelming majority of political Islamist groups that rely on peaceful means to call for change. Al-Qaeda hijacked the religion because of its loud and outrageous actions, but the organization is actually a very small minority of all political Islamist groups. 

There are three general categories of political Islamist groups. The first is al-Qaeda and similar violent outfits whose theater of operation is the entire world. They are extremely ideological and uninterested in compromise. According to their logic, whoever is not with them is against them and therefore must die—there is no room for dialogue with these groups. 

We have seen al-Qaeda’s influence wane in Iraq, Morocco, and many places around the world. The doctrine of terrorism and violence has peaked and is on its way down, but that doesn’t mean al-Qaeda and other militant groups have disappeared. Al-Qaeda has always thrived in countries that lack total control over their entire territory—that was the case in Iraq and is the case in Yemen today. Weak states continue to provide fertile ground for al-Qaeda to operate. 

The second category of political Islamists uses violence, but the theater of operation is limited to the countries where there is an occupation. Hamas and Hezbollah are the prime examples. These groups have one leg outside of the system and one inside, as they have members in the parliament in Palestine or Lebanon.  

And finally, the third category is the vast majority of political Islamist groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood, in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Yemen. These groups do not use violence and are part of the political processes in their own countries. While the size and number of nonviolent groups easily outstrips other categories, the loudest voice has been al-Qaeda, given its sensational terrorist acts. 

Will the successful raid on bin Laden’s hiding spot change the perception of the United States in the region? What should the United States do next? 

 The perception of the United States in the Arab world is tarnished for two main reasons—the stalled Arab-Israeli peace process and the Iraq war. The Arab-Israeli conflict is the single most damaging issue to the American image in the region. And the invasion of Iraq was not seen as a war on al-Qaeda, but as an illegitimate occupation, particularly when al-Qaeda was not present in Iraq prior to the war. 

While the United States has had clear policies against al-Qaeda and terrorism, Washington obviously prioritized stability over democracy in the Arab world at the same time. The Obama administration needs to reassess this strategy in the face of revolutionary change in the Arab world and bin Laden’s killing. 

The challenge for the United States is not to have a singular focus on terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda, but to have a policy that recognizes that stability, reform, peace, and security are all interlinked—and must be pursued simultaneously. Instead of pursuing a policy that seeks stability over reform, it should follow one that seeks stability through reform and peace. 

Washington now needs to engage emerging Arab regimes that will be more democratic and want to establish a good relationship with the United States. But the new governments won’t necessarily agree with the United States on everything and will undoubtedly pursue interests that are more responsive to their citizens—this is just how it should be. The majority of the Arab public rejects al-Qaeda’s tactics, but increasingly won’t accept leaders who are seen as sell-outs, like former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. 

A new U.S. strategy can establish relations in the region that will be both helpful for the West and take into account the interests of those countries

The Bin Laden Conspiracy Theories

Why Falsehoods Flourish in the Muslim World

Matthew Gray

May 4, 2011

Immediately after the death of Osama bin Laden was announced, rumors about it swirled through the streets, coffee shops, and Internet cafés of the Middle East, Pakistan, and other parts of the Muslim world. The raid took place, some claimed, only to hand U.S. President Barack Obama a political victory, or to give him political cover for the troop drawdown in Afghanistan. Other, more outlandish, theories proposed that bin Laden had been collaborating with Washington all along. Another one had it that bin Laden died years ago but that his body had been frozen and retained for later use by the United States; still others suggested that he remained alive. “There are numerous question marks still seeking clear and honest answers from the American administration,” went an opinion piece in the Palestinian paper Al-Quds Al-Arabi. “Why did we not see the corpse of the Sheikh until this moment, while all we have heard was that it was ‘buried’ at sea because his homeland the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia refused to receive it?” Some have even suggested that the world’s most wanted terrorist was not real but an American invention.
Conspiracy theories like these are especially common in the Middle East and western Asia. Why? At the simplest level, conspiracy theories in the region are a way of displaying skepticism toward the United States. But they can also be earnest attempts by the angry to explain dramatic events, particularly when people have difficulty accepting them: most residents of Abbottabad were no doubt amazed to learn that they had been neighbors of bin Laden. Media reports have quoted some Abbottabad locals as saying that in the absence of any evidence that bin Laden or other Arab extremists had been living in the town, the bin Laden story simply had to be a conspiracy.
One reason the region is so susceptible to conspiracy theories is that it has been subject to an unusually high number of actual conspiracies in the past. The overthrow of Iranian President Mohammed Mossadeq in 1953 was driven by a secret U.S. and British plot to remove him, and the 1956 Suez War was the result of a covert British-French-Israeli agreement struck in France. Thus, today’s conspiracy theorists often cite real conspiracies of the past as evidence for present-day ones. During the 2003 Iraq war, for example, many Middle Eastern commentators brought up the Suez War: If one generation of foreigners could craft a scheme to conquer a recalcitrant Arab leader, the argument went, why could another not do the same, half a century later? Now, as conspiracies about bin Laden gain currency, those peddling them will likely point to past American plots in the Muslim world, real or imagined, for support.
Conspiracy theories also flourish where people feel disempowered -- a condition that applies to the Muslim world. In much of the region today, there is  a sense of ideological aimlessness and a feeling that the region, for all its history, is unfairly weak and vulnerable compared to the West. Even bin Laden used rhetoric along these lines, justifying jihad as a counterattack against a conspiracy and explaining the Crusades as a Western and Christian conspiracy against Islam. Conspiracy theorists seek to counter these sentiments of disempowerment. Feeling as though one possesses rare or secret knowledge and controlling who shares such information can bring one a sense of power and privilege. This is true even at the societal level: a culture that feels vulnerable can find solace in a conspiratorial perspective of their condition.

The Middle East has been subject to an unusually high number of actual conspiracies in the past.

Another factor explaining the ubiquity of conspiracy thinking in the Middle East is the presence of authoritarian governments there. Dictators may spread such ideas themselves as propaganda, to confuse their citizens, divide the opposition, or rally support for the regime or nation. (They may also tolerate or nurture conspiracy claims coming from society, usually for the same reasons.) At times, leaders or elites in Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and elsewhere have mouthed conspiracy theories or encouraged others to do so. In the past few months, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi have each cited foreign conspiracies as a source of protests in their countries; the Iranian leadership often justifies the regime’s actions as a response to U.S. or “Zionist” plots. While bin Laden enjoyed little sympathy among the rulers of the Middle East, if conspiracy theories about him mean that people pay less attention to examining their own governments, few leaders will try to stop conspiracy talk.
Given how common conspiracy theories are, and how fragmented, conflict-prone, and anti-American the Middle East can be, is there any hope of conspiracy claims being countered? Direct counterargument is useless; it is exactly what conspiracy theorists expect from a plotter, and it may even strengthen their case. This is why it is a mistake for the U.S. State Department to engage conspiracy theories as it does, posting takedowns of them on its Web site. While understandable, such initiatives are probably futile in changing the views of those most being targeted. Likewise, releasing a photograph of bin Laden’s body will convince only those who remain open-minded about bin Laden’s death: it will have no impact on die-hard conspiracy theorists, or even those customarily suspicious of the United States.
In fact, countering conspiracy theories is extremely difficult. To ignore the claims being made is often the only practical tactic, but rarely will that eliminate or weaken the charge being made or its appeal. When a conspiracy theory dies, it is usually because it becomes redundant by losing its validity, relevance, or believability. Most anti-Catholic and anti-Mason conspiracies in the United States have atrophied this way, and in the Middle East, conspiracies about French or Soviet meddling have mostly disappeared, too. Yet while undermining the complaints or fears that drive a conspiracy theory is possible, it takes an inordinately long time.
The alternative is to promote transparency as an antidote to conspiracy. A more open government is less threatening to its people, and institutions and businesses that are more responsive will also seem less malevolent or suspicious. Although mistrust between state and society -- and across national and cultural boundaries -- is a root of conspiracy theories in the Muslim world, addressing it is nearly impossible. It requires substantive domestic political reform (if not democratization), a true attack on corruption and nepotism, and genuine social reforms that protect minorities and subgroups.
But the problem is that most of the Middle East and western Asia is struggling with economic challenges and social and political cleavages. Despite the success of popular uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere in recent months, much of the region continues to live under autocratic or authoritarian regimes. The reforms that might help counter conspiracy theories are especially improbable in developing societies with weak states. This is one reason for the preponderance and endurance of conspiracy theories in much of the Middle East and other parts of the Muslim world. And it is one reason why development, liberalization, and transparency will not bring about the demise of conspiracy theories there anytime soon.

What's Next for al-Qaeda?

What's Next for al-Qaeda?

Authors:

Richard N. Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations Robert Danin, Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies, Council on Foreign Relations Steven A. Cook, Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations Max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia, Council on Foreign Relations John B. Bellinger III, Adjunct Senior Fellow for International and National Security Law, CFR; former legal adviser to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice

May 2, 2011

Osama bin Laden's death in a raid by U.S. troops on his compound north of Islamabad, Pakistan, is both a symbolic and real blow to al-Qaeda. But will it mean an end to terrorism or to al-Qaeda's hold on the imaginations of radicals in the Middle East and elsewhere? Most likely it won't, according to five CFR experts who weighed in on the subject.
While bin Laden's killing sends a strong signal to extremists, it doesn't spell an end to their efforts, particularly those enabled by Pakistan, says CFR President Richard N. Haass. In contrast, Ray Takeyh argues that the revolts in the Middle East suggest that while bin Laden's death is a laudable triumph of U.S. efforts, the region has moved on and bin Laden is largely a symbol of a passing era. Robert Danin agrees with Takeyh, noting that many moderate Sunnis and Shiites in the Middle East will be pleased at bin Laden's demise, although some extremists will want to resurrect him as a symbolic martyr. That impulse could be especially strong in countries like Yemen, where the government is weak and vulnerable, says Steven A. Cook, who also believes most Arabs are interested in transitioning to more open political systems. Max Boot warns that maintaining a "comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign" in Afghanistan is crucial to preventing the country from falling back into terrorist hands. Daniel Markey observes that while bin Laden's death could be an opportunity to improve U.S.-Pakistan relations, it's more likely to exacerbate tensions than to enhance cooperation. On the legal basis for the attack, John Bellinger says the killing was lawful under both U.S. domestic law and international law.

Richard N. Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations
The killing of Osama bin Laden constitutes a significant victory over global terrorism. But it is a milestone, not a turning point, in what remains an ongoing struggle without a foreseeable end.

The significance of what was accomplished stems from bin Laden's symbolic importance. He has been an icon, one representing the ability to strike with success against the United States and the West. That icon is now gone.

There is also the demonstration effect of what U.S. Special Forces are able to do. It sends a clear message to terrorists that they are at least as vulnerable as those they would seek to hurt.

But any celebration needs to be tempered by two realities. The first is that bin Laden's demise is in no way to be equated with the demise of terrorism. There is no time for a V-T Day--a Victory over Terrorism Day celebration.

Terrorism is a decentralized phenomenon--in its funding, planning, and execution. Removing bin Laden does not end the threat. There are successors in al-Qaeda--and successors in autonomous groups operating out of Yemen, Somalia, and other countries. So terrorism will continue. Indeed, it could even grow somewhat worse in the short run as there are sure to be those who will want to show that they can still strike against the West.

The second reason for responding with caution to this welcome development is that it underscores yet again that Pakistan, home of some of the most dangerous terrorists in the world, is decidedly less than a full partner. Some parts of the government there are sympathetic to terrorism and unwilling to act against it; others are simply unable to given a lack of capacity. This reality is unlikely to change. As a result, the sort of independent operation carried out against bin Laden is likely to be the rule as much as the exception going forward.
Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
The death of Osama bin Laden delivered another symbolic blow to two interrelated concepts that have done much to bedevil the West: Islamic radicalism wedded to terrorism as its most suitable expression. The Arab Spring had already done much to discredit bin Laden's foundational ideology. Al-Qaeda had long denounced pluralism and representation as fraudulent conceits of the West. Granting power to men who presumably knew the mind of God, violence against the West and imposition of severe cultural restrictions were its only offerings to the region's restive youth. There was little room in this vision for political emancipation, diversity of opinion, or economic empowerment. From Tunisia to Yemen, the Arab masses rejected this ideology through word and deed. The Arab revolt is a denunciation of radicalism in all its hues: whether autocrats ruling in the name of modernization or Islamists pledging redemption through terror.

As the region moved beyond bin Laden's ideology, it also left behind his methods. Al-Qaeda had professed that the only means of displacing Arab despots was to unleash terror against their presumed patron--the United States. The "enemy abroad" was the focal point of its wrath. Yet the Arab masses proved that the likes of Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and Tunisia's Zine-el-Abidine Ben Ali can actually be overthrown through peaceful mobilization of people power. Islamist terror only offered the Arab strongmen a rationale for maintaining power, as they conveniently brandished the specter of Islamist power as a justification for their autocracy. Ironically, al-Qaeda, its ideology, and its terrorism may have prolonged the lifespan of an order it professed to despise.

In the end, the Middle East has moved beyond bin Laden. Though his death should certainly be celebrated as a triumph of painstaking efforts by the U.S. government, he can only be remembered as a discredited relic of an increasingly vanishing era.
Robert Danin, Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Bin Laden's death brings to a close the decade-long search for the mastermind of the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. As such, it will mark a significant turning point, though not an end, to the U.S.-declared "War Against Terror." The significance of bin Laden's departure, especially given al-Qaeda's decentralized structure, will likely be more symbolic than operational. Terrorism did not begin with al-Qaeda, nor will it end with al-Qaeda weakened, though weakened it will be. Nonetheless, bin Laden's death deals a blow to those who took inspiration from the Saudi-born terrorist leader, and demonstrates that the United States remains a superpower with global reach.

In the Middle East, bin Laden's death will serve as a sort of Rorschach test. Many moderate Sunni Arabs and Shiites will welcome his departure from the scene, some explicitly, others tacitly. Mahmoud Abbas's Palestinian Authority welcomed bin Laden's death as a victory for moderation, while his soon-to-be partner Hamas denounced the killing. Israel, long in the vanguard in the fight against terrorism, sees vindication of its own assertive and often creative approach against terrorist leaders worldwide. In Abu Dhabi today, the foreign ministers of Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates met and declined to comment on bin Laden's death. Nor have the Saudis commented so far. The fear that bin Laden instilled for some is likely to live on.

Given the unrest sweeping the Arab world, bin Laden's death is likely to be less significant to the people of the Middle East than otherwise would have been the case. For many Arabs, bin Laden had represented a violent reaction to the Arab's powerlessness and failure to measure up to the West. Yet even for many who had sympathized with his tactics, bin Laden had become an embarrassment, having helped solidify a global image of the Arabs as terrorists. The Arab uprisings now sweeping the region are an attempt to forge a new Arab image and identity.

Now that Arabs from the Atlantic to the Gulf of Oman are taking matters into their own hands, bin Laden may well be forgotten more quickly than he is in the United States, where he murdered thousands of Americans and perforated the nation's sense that international affairs take place abroad and not at home. Yet for a small but significant group of bin Laden's followers, he will be a symbolic martyr whose death will now need to be avenged.
Steven A. Cook, Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Osama bin Laden's death is an enormously symbolic event for the Arab world. The Saudi-born al-Qaeda leader represented a worldview shared by a small but influential group of Arabs. In this season of change in the Middle East, there will no doubt be those who seek to carry on bin Laden's jihad, but the demands of Tunisian, Egyptians, Syrians, Bahrainis, and others to live in democratic societies suggest that bin Laden's ideological reach was quite limited.
Even as al-Qaeda and its theoreticians welcomed the recent demise of Tunisia's Zine al Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak--and would probably like to see Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi and Syria's Bashar al-Assad go, too--the political change in the Middle East is not good for the al-Qaeda franchise.
If countries in the region manage to make the transition to more open political systems, individuals will have the opportunity to resolve their grievances through political institutions that preclude them from taking up arms against their own states or the United States. More important, it is clear that the vast majority of Arabs do not share bin Laden and al-Qaeda's view that the only legitimate authority on earth is God's. They support the sovereignty of manmade law, so long as it is just.
That said, Hamas's quick condemnation of the U.S. military operation that brought bin Laden to justice, and the fact that extremists are likely to seek revenge, suggests that there is still fertile ground for al-Qaeda in the Middle East and beyond. At the very least, al-Qaeda affiliates can find opportunity to set down roots in places like Yemen, and perhaps Libya and Syria, where Arab leaders have lost their grip but society has not fallen into Somalia-like chaos.
Max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
What does the death of Osama bin Laden mean for the war in Afghanistan?
The positive impact is obvious: bin Laden had a close alliance with Taliban leader Mullah Omar. No doubt many Taliban and associated operatives (e.g., in the Haqqani network) viewed bin Laden as a great holy warrior who charted the way forward in the battle against infidels, crusaders, and Zionists. His death could, therefore, strike a significant psychological blow against insurgents. It may also have more direct repercussions. If bin Laden was still acting, as he had in the past, as a key intermediary between the Taliban and its wealthy Persian Gulf backers, then his death would clearly interrupt the flow of funding.
But oddly enough, bin Laden's death may also be a setback for the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan, at least in the West. In justifying his surge in Afghanistan, President Obama has put too much rhetorical weight on the need to counter al-Qaeda. The president has repeatedly claimed that all we were doing in Afghanistan was denying al-Qaeda the ability to use that country as a sanctuary. With bin Laden dead, many Americans may decide that the threat from al-Qaeda is also gone and that we can afford to draw down in Afghanistan. Not so.
Whatever al-Qaeda's fate (and it is too early to tell whether it will be able to survive its "emir's" demise), other Islamist terrorist groups will not be significantly hindered. This includes groups such as the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Haqqani network, all at least as virulent as al-Qaeda if lacking, so far, its global ambition. A comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan is still vital to prevent that country from falling to Osama bin Laden's fellow travelers.
Moreover, by maintaining a large presence in Afghanistan, the United States can also project power into Pakistan--as Navy SEALs showed by swooping down on bin Laden's compound. Given how unstable Pakistan remains (instability that may well be exacerbated by the fallout from this raid), it is imperative that we have bases nearby, and no location is as convenient or secure as Afghanistan.
Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia, Council on Foreign Relations
Osama bin Laden's death comes at a time of intense crisis between the United States and Pakistan. Its repercussions have the potential to launch the bilateral relationship off a cliff, or to bring U.S. and Pakistani strategic interests into better alignment.
Some Pakistanis, already enraged over U.S. drone strikes and the Raymond Davis affair, are more concerned about the U.S. raid in Abbottabad being a violation of Pakistan's territorial sovereignty than they are about bin Laden's death. If terrorists launch a wave of reprisal attacks, Pakistanis will be on the receiving end. Some will undoubtedly question whether their security interests were well served by bin Laden's killing.
Pakistan's leadership will have doubts about continued U.S. engagement in their region, what with bin Laden dead and a phased military withdrawal from Afghanistan taking shape. For all their frustrations with Washington, they also fear abandonment.
Many Americans, convinced that Pakistan has done less than it might to confront radical militants and terrorists, see their worst suspicions confirmed by the fact that bin Laden lived in a large, well-protected compound right under the Pakistani military's nose. Either Pakistan's intelligence service is terribly incompetent, fatally compromised, or both, raising questions about its utility as a partner.
Americans and Pakistanis, therefore, have reasons to give in to their mistrust. A more constructive outcome is possible, but it will require both sides to think about long-term interests rather than near-term frustrations. If handled smartly, bin Laden's death could mark a major reversal of momentum for extremists and their supporters throughout South Asia.
That reversal would have to start in Islamabad, where too many military and intelligence officials have actively or passively supported militants and terrorists as a means to project influence into Afghanistan and India. They will need to rethink such strategies. Recognizing that no terrorist group can escape Washington's reach, Pakistan should now lend its unconditional support to confronting and eliminating the wide range of terrorists operating from its soil.
But that would not be enough. Bin Laden's death hardly clears the way for disengagement from Pakistan. Disengagement is likely to enable the rise of a new, perhaps even more dangerous, generation of terrorists. Instead, America's strategy for the post-bin Laden era must be a far greater commitment to helping Pakistan overcome the political, economic and security conditions that make it an appealing safe haven for terrorists like bin Laden. Such an effort will be costly, and it will take years.
Unfortunately, bin Laden's death is more likely to exacerbate tensions between Washington and Islamabad than to encourage such farsighted cooperation. But this would be a tragic waste of an historic opportunity to write a more positive chapter in U.S.-Pakistan relations.
John B. Bellinger III, Adjunct Senior Fellow for International and National Security Law, CFR; former legal adviser to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
The U.S. killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan was lawful under both U.S. domestic law and international law. The U.S. government's legal rationale will be similar to arguments used by both the Bush and Obama administrations to justify drone strikes against other al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan and elsewhere.  The Authorization to Use Military Force Act of September 18, 2001, authorizes the president to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against persons who authorized, planned, or committed the 9/11 attacks.
The killing is not prohibited by the longstanding assassination prohibition in Executive Order 12333 because the action was a military action in the ongoing U.S. armed conflict with al-Qaeda and it is not prohibited to kill specific leaders of an opposing force. The assassination prohibition also does not apply to killings in self-defense. The executive branch will also argue that the action was permissible under international law both as a permissible use of force in the U.S. armed conflict with al-Qaeda and as a legitimate action in self-defense, given that bin Laden was clearly planning additional attacks.
Some critics of the administration's legal theory that the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda might--if they were consistent with their past criticisms--argue that the United States did not have a right to use military force against bin Laden outside of Afghanistan, and that Washington should instead have sent an extradition request to Pakistan or asked the Pakistani government to arrest bin Laden.  But such traditional critics may prefer to remain silent in this instance.
In addition, under the UN Charter, the United States would normally be prohibited from using force inside Pakistan without obtaining Pakistan's consent. It is not clear whether the Obama administration received the consent of the Pakistani government to use force inside Pakistan in this case, but the Pakistani government appears at least to have consented after the fact to this potential infringement of its sovereignty.