Lost opportunity?

 Dawn

By Moeed Yusuf | 4/16/2012 12:00:00 AMPAKISTAN`S civil-military landscape has begun to change quite significantly. The independent media, judicial activism, the military`s preoccupation with the fight against terrorism, and geopolitical developments had already set the ball rolling.

But a number of embarrassing developments for the military in 2011 have ended up opening up unprecedented space for the civilians in the national security and foreign policy arena.

The trend is nascent but not to be ignored. Most countries that have managed to correct civil-military imbalances start off with incremental steps and are often helped along by unplanned and unexpected developments that incentivise new behaviour patterns on the part of the militaries and greater responsibility by the civilian authorities.Of course, not all manage this feat. There is voluminous literature attempting to identify the key factors that determine whether a country is able to redress civil-military imbalances. And while evidence shows that ahost of complex factors tend to align before this paradigm shift takes place, one of the most critical happens to be the ability of the civilians to prove their capacity and competence by outperforming the militaries.

In cases where civilians have managed to use the space available to them to produce impressive outputs, the chances of a permanent correction in the institutional imbalance are much greater.

The past weeks have provided us with an opportunity to see the Pakistani civilian enclave take charge of one of the most critical foreign policy issues: the relationship with the US.

The development was entirely positive as it allowed a civilian-led process to take precedence over ad hoc, non-transparent decision-making by a handful of individuals that had otherwise been the norm in Pakistan.

Unfortunately, the outcome has left much to be desired.

For one, the review process was dragged onforfar too long. The upper hand in terms of the US being on the back foot after Salala that Pakistan went into the review with has been lost.

In fact, as I discussed in a recent column in this space, the lack of closure on the review forced the US to consider alter-host of complex factors tend to align before this paradigm shift takes place, one of the most critical happens to be the ability of the civilians to prove their capacity and competence by outperforming the militaries.

In cases where civilians have managed to use the space available to them to produce impressive outputs, the chances of a permanent correction in the institutional imbalance are much greater.

The past weeks have provided us with an opportunity to see the Pakistani civilian enclave take charge of one of the most critical foreign policy issues: the relationship with the US.

The development was entirely positive as it allowed a civilian-led process to take precedence over ad hoc, non-transparent decision-making by a handful of individuals that had otherwise been the norm in Pakistan.

Unfortunately, the outcome has left much to be desired.

For one, the review process was dragged onforfar too long. The upper hand in terms of the US being on the back foot after Salala that Pakistan went into the review with has been lost.

In fact, as I discussed in a recent column in this space, the lack of closure on the review forced the US to consider alter-natives, however imperfect, more seriously. Going forward, this experience will only lead Washington to reinforce channels that tend to reduce reliance on Pakistan.

But let us set aside this brinkmanship game.

The real issue is that if Pakistan is committed to peace in Afghanistan and wants to play a major role in the reconciliation process next door, it needed to re-engage swiftly. By dragging out the process, while it has certainly hurt the US agenda, it has not done itself any favours. The more time the two sides lose in terms of working together on Afghanistan, the lesser the likelihood of a sustainable deal and the greater the possibility of the dreaded civil war.

Nothing could be worse from Pakistan`s perspective.

There is no better indicator of the problems with the review process than the fact that the civilian and military authorities themselves opened up paral-lel tracks to reinitiate interaction with US officials much before parliament approved the recommendations. This was contrary to the initial stance of `no contact` till parliament agreed on a new course for the relationship. Heads of government have met; so have the Pakistani foreign minister and US secretary of state; as have the top military officials. Indeed, smart statecraft demanded this move. But it also undermined the sanctity of the review process.

Second, the very tenor of the debate, underpinned by emotive rhetoric rather than sound policy thinking bodes ill for parliament`s efforts to claim its right to oversee this business in the future.

Behind closed doors, some within the executive branch were wondering days ago how long the debate on the floor could continue before the executive would simply have to push for a closure to the debate and then determine a realistic set of final conditions for the relationship`s reset even at the cost of defying the mood in parliament.

This is still likely since in terms of the substance of the recommendations, the review has failed to balance politicking with the necessities of statecraft. The hawkish line has been pushed too far -to the point that the Pakistani position has been boxed in by rather dogmatic conditions. Some of parliament`s demands are ones that the civilian and military authorities themselves may be both unwilling and unable to implement.

The most obvious example is drones.

It is not at all clear if the military is as opposed to selective drone strikes as it portrays in public and it is fairly obvious that there is little it can do should the strikes continue. Consider Pakistan`s options upon the next drone strike: will the state remain mum and thereby defy parliament, or will it respond harshly and create a fresh crisis in the bilateral relationship? Other recommendations like disallowing weapons to pass through the Nato supply route may also be impossible to implement.

Looking to the days ahead, the state machinery will inevitably end up bypassing or disregarding some of recommendations in the interest of keeping the relationship going. But since this wouldbe done in defiance of parliament`s verdict, it would potentially widen the intra-civilian (government versus opposition) and civil-military divides.

Corollary: we are likely to witness far more politically motivatedmudslinging on this issue among the civilians and between them and the military in the days ahead. The right-wing rhetoric is likely to gain further as it bashes the authorities for having disregarded parliament to appease the US.

The parliamentary review was a great opportunity for the civilians to begin claiming back more of their rightful space in decision-making on security/foreign policy issues. But what could have been a precedent-setting event may now be seen as a reason not to try the parliamentary channel next time round.

As unfair as this outcome may be given that Pakistani politicians have never had a real chance to develop collective thinking on these issues and that much of the problems that beset the USPakistan relationship originated under the military regime of Gen Musharraf, empirical evidence from elsewhere nonetheless holds out a staunch warning for troubled democracies whose civilian enclaves miss such opportunities to impress too often. The odds are stacked against them and in favour of the status quo power institutions the military.

This is just the reality of it. • The writer is South Asia adviser at the US Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.

A foreign-born scholar of Pakistani descent, Dr Azeem Ibrahim, a PhD from Cambridge University, a former Research Scholar at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and a World Fellow at Yale, world's top three seats of learning, has joined Imran Khan and has been named his Strategic Policy Development Advisor.
In a special article for The News, Dr Azeem said it was time the country achieved its "second independence" and threw off the denigrating suggestions that it is a failed state, a client state or a country on the brink of disaster.
He writes: "When Pakistan became independent in 1947, its founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah envisaged a democratic country embodying the essential principles of Islam, rather than being a theocratic state. "Sixty five years later, his vision of a democratic state has yet to be fully realized. Pakistan is still awaiting true independence - freedom from being a client state, freedom from fear of its neighbour India and freedom from economic disasters, military adventurism and political instability.
"To achieve these freedoms, Pakistan must look to new leadership - strong, informed and visionary yet pragmatic leadership. This is why I joined the team of Imran Khan, chairman of the Tehreek-e-Insaf party and likely the next Prime Minister of Pakistan. As a foreign-born Pakistani and independent academic, I look at Pakistan with pride in my heritage and great hopes for its political and economic future.
Pakistan has lurched from one unfulfilled democratic government to military rule and back again - each change bringing false hopes for meaningful change. Without respect for a strong constitution, Pakistan's leaders so far have been unable to rise above the enormity of Pakistan's problems and all in their different ways have failed to bring real democracy to the country.
The corruption and nepotism which has marred Pakistan's politics continues to offset the power struggles between mosque, military and political parties. Some of the most refreshing revelations came recently with the release of thousands of classified US State Department cables through WikiLeaks.
The published cables revealed that Pakistan saw the drone attacks as so effective that they wanted some of their own. President Asif Ali Zardari "made repeated pleas for drones to be put in Pakistan's hands, so that Pakistan would own the issue and drone attacks (including collateral damage) would not provoke anti-Americanism", one of the cables said. Another Pakistani leader is quoted as saying about the drone attacks," I don't care if they do it as long as they get the right people. We'll protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it."
Also revealed was the duplicity of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz leaders who had informed the Americans that, in spite of the party's demands to have the chief justice reinstated, they did not really care for Iftikhar Chaudhry and hoped to remove him once they had scored the requisite political points. Denials were immediately forthcoming but the many disclosures from WikiLeaks - often in less than diplomatic language - prove the duplicity and corruption of politics endemic in Pakistan today.
After a careful reading of the WikiLeaks cables relating to Pakistan, I established that Imran Khan was the only person who said the same thing in private that he said in public and I am convinced that this was a man and a movement I could be associated with as an independent academic and policy expert.
After meeting with Imran Khan on several occasions, I was even more convinced that he is the leader Pakistan needs to move the country forward, finally realizing the destiny that Jinnah had envisioned. Our long and detailed sessions discussing his plans for a new Pakistan, reveal a man with an unusual ability to absorb complex information and to ask the right questions. His recognition that there are no simplistic solutions is a necessary starting point - it is not the economy, the military budget, the lack of spending on education, jobs and healthcare - it is a combination of all of these within the global environment of diminishing resources that needs addressing. The changing nature of the European Community and the shifting economies of China and the United States all must be factored in to Pakistan's future and I believe that Imran Khan has the capacity as statesman, not just politician, to understand these complexities as well as to deal with national issues.
I feel privileged to be invited to be a part of the planning process, and to be considered a strategic policy adviser to the Khan campaign as it transitions from an opposition party to a government in waiting. I believe that Imran Khan is not only the best hope for Pakistan right now, but he is the only hope and his success in the next election- whenever that will be - will be an embodiment of the hopes and dreams identified by Jinnah for Pakistan those sixty- five momentous years ago.

A conflict zone

A conflict zone

By Mohammad Waseem | 12/13/2011 12:00:00 AM
 WHAT is most in jeopardy? Relations between Washington and Islamabad, between the civil and military wings of the state, between the executive and judiciary or between the PPP-led government and the PML-N opposition? Pakistan is fast turning into a conflict zone. Memogate has landed the country in the midst of a potentially lethal clash of institutions, not directly and immediately but in terms of setting the precedent for civil-military relations in future. The ultimate ownership of the state, whether in the hands of the army or the elected representatives, is again in question.

At the heart of the matter, this time, is not a Bonapartist general who committed the treasonable offence of violat-ing the constitution, as has happened four times in Pakistan`s history, but a civilian ruling set-up that allegedly sought Washington`s help in pre-empting a much-feared putsch after the Abbottabad operation. Some pointto the misplaced smartness of the protagonists while others see intellectual paucity in the whole venture.The crisis of civil-military relations was enmeshed along parallel lines of conflict when Nawaz Sharif filed a case in the Supreme Court for investigating the matter. Given the acute mistrust between the executive and the judiciary, this case can further discredit and weaken the civilian government in Islamabad and accelerate its downslide.

The court initially misfired. It established an inquiry commission, but the person in charge excused himself from serving in that position. The party in government launched a public campaign against Nawaz Sharif`s recourse to the Supreme Court, instead of parliament, especially as it is typically the prerogative of the executive to institute a commission of inquiry. On its part, the PML-N feared a loss of initiative in the case, and relied on the judiciary instead.

That raised political temperatures.

The Sharifs are concerned about the possible slippage of ground in oppositionist politics to the Pakistan Tehrik-iInsaaf. They feel obliged to safeguard their constituency in Punjab and make inroads elsewhere. They operated in theperspective of a breakdown of communication with the PPP. The two sides have no understanding on the rules of the game and no agreement on not undermining the strategic interests of the other.

All this is played out against the worst crisis in US-Pakistan relations in half a century. The two countries have had long periods of coolness, especially during the 1970s and the 1990s. But, their current relations have no parallel in terms of the lack of trust and loud expression of this through diplomatic and strategic channels. Both are unsure about the outcome of the current exercise in brinkmanship.

The loss of life in the Nato attack on the Salala check post, followed by the vacating of the Shamsi airbase by the US and the stopping of military supplies to the war machinery across the border is a symptom rather than the cause ofthe latest crisis in US-Pakistan relations.

At issue is the Afghanistan endgame.

The regional power structure is developing along certain lines which do not promise a role for Pakistan.

Islamabad had not been able to cultivate a non-Taliban Pakhtun constituency in Afghanistan, in the face of rival contenders for power led by the proIndia Northern Alliance. It has not fully appreciated the sense of disgust felt by both regional and global powers for the Taliban as the leading terrorist group of the world and a legatee of Al Qaeda.

This situation has led to ad hocism in policy and profile, which is more reactive than planned. The conference of Pakistan`s ambassadors and high commissioners in Islamabad this week has come too late after the signing of the India-Afghanistan strategic partnership and Nato plans to strengthen the Afghan army irrespective of the inconclusive deliberations of the Bonn conference.

Meanwhile, the spillover of Talibanisation in Pakistan has found fertile ground in the local political landscape. Various political groupings on the right of the centre have shied away from condemning the perpetrators ofviolence and distanced themselves from what is considered to be America`s war against terror. Islamic outfits have especially thrived on the new wave of nationalist upsurge.

A minority within the establishment circles feels appalled at the way the nationalist discourse has been directed towards an uncharted path. A debate on policy options has been foreclosed under the pressure of jingoist phraseology used by both the emergent political leadership and political analysts.

Policy outcomes are far less discussed than projected and claimed. This may cost the nation and its decision-makers an objective outlook, a commitment to getting out of regional and global isolation and the pursuit of thinking out of the box. For the purpose of evolving a set of productive and genuinely nationalistic policies, the pall of darkness over serious channels of public expressionmust be removed.

A serious development is the government`s agreement with T e h r ik -iT a li b a n Pakistan. It is underscored by the government`s public expression of gratitude for the Taliban for not car-rying out terrorist attacks on the Muharram rallies. It seems that the diplomatic isolation is now leading the powers that be to fall back on the Taliban since all other international channels are getting squeezed. This is a defeatist policy.

What is needed is a cool and objective analysis of the sources of insecurity for Pakistan, especially with reference to Afghanistan and India. There is a need to address questions as to what substantive re-evaluation in the policy framework can be undertaken, how we can cut down our losses and which regional powers we can approach with an open mind in order to develop a partial agreement on both the ends and the means.

The need of the hour is to create a national consensus not on the basis of a one-dimensional assertion of our ideological position but on keeping our house in order. This would involve keeping civil-military relations on an even keel, holding back spoilers from destabilising the political landscape and putting in place a mechanism of damage control vis-à-vis foreign and domestic policy.

Lacklustre performance

Lack lustre performance

By Naseer Memon | 12/13/2011 12:00:00 AM
 PAKISTAN has slipped 20 rungs on the ladder of human development this year. Last year, Pakistan was ranked 125th on the Human Development Index (HDI) and was in the category of `medium human development`.

This year Pakistan has been ranked 145 and thus falls in the category of `low human development` countries. The latest annual Human Development Report of UNDP has ranked 187 countries on the HDI. Among the Saarc countries, Pakistan has performed better than Bangladesh (146), Afghanistan (172) and Nepal (157), whereas India (134), Sri Lanka (97), Bhutan (141) and the Maldives (109) have outshone Pakistan. No South Asian country is ranked in the `very high human development` category though nearby Iran ranking at 88 falls in the category of `high human development`. Sri Lanka and the Maldives are the only two Saarc countries ranked among the countries in the `medium human development` category.

HDI is a composite index made up of an assortment of indicators including gender inequality, poverty, environmental sustainability, impact of natural disasters, education, health, population and the economy. Each country is ranked on these indicators. A cursory look at a few indicators and comparison with closely ranked Asian countries would help in understanding Pakistan`s overall performance.

While an analysis of HDI rankings since 1990 shows that Pakistan has steadily improved on its scale, its annual average HDI growth is marginal at 1.12 per cent. Bangladesh, India and even Afghanistan have marked faster strides on this with annual average HDI growth rates of 1.69, 1.38 and 2.32 per cent respec-tively. This clearly shows that successive governments in Pakistan have not accorded due importance to human development; certainly not in comparison with regional countries.

On the `gender inequality index` female participation in secondary education and the labour force is lower in Pakistan compared to India and Bangladesh. In fact, the latter country has higher female participation in secondary education i.e.

30.8 compared to Pakistan`s 23.5 and India`s 26.6 per cent. Female participation in the labour force isalso higher in Bangladesh with 58.7 compared to India`s 32.8 and Pakistan`s dismally low 23.5 per cent. Even Afghanistan with all its socio-political odds demonstrated an impressive 33.1 per cent female participation in the labour force.

Iran, which is often derided as a conservative society, has a 39 per cent female population that has benefited from secondary education and 31.9 per cent female participation in the labour force. This indicates the gravity of gender discrimination in Pakistan. Both education and participation in the labour force are key indicators of women`s empowerment, social emancipation and political contribution.

On the `poverty index`, Pakistan has a smaller percentage of people living in severe poverty (27.4 per cent) compared to India (28.6 per cent) but Bangladesh fares slightly better at 26.2 per cent. Given that Bangladesh is a relatively younger economy and a chronic victim of disasters, its performance on this account is appreciable.

Environmental sustainability is another indicator of Pakistan`s dreary performance. Pakistan`s land under forest cover is a mere 2.3 per cent against Bangladesh`s 11.1 and India`s 22.9 per cent. The rate of deforestation in Pakistan is alarming. According to some estimates, the country loses some 66,718 acres of forest cover annually.In the areas of core human development i.e. water quality, education and health, Pakistan`s performance is a major reason behind its overall dismal ranking. On all three counts, Pakistan`s performance on several key sub indicators is the lowest in the region.

For example, only 55 per cent of population in the country is satisfied with the quality of water. In Bangladesh, the percentage is 69.5, in Afghanistan 60.7 and in India 62.7. In the Saarc region, the mortality rate of under-five years children at 87 per 1,000 live births is the highest in Pakistan compared to India`s 66, Nepal`s 48, Sri Lanka`s 15, the Maldives`13, Bhutan`s 79 and Bangladesh`s 52. The only exception is Afghanistan where this figure is 199 for understandable reasons.

Resource allocation on health and education is a signature indicator to fathom the state`s commitment to human development. On these, Pakistan fares preposterously low, in fact the lowest in the Saarc countries.

Public expenditure on education and health as percentage of GDP in Pakistan is 2.6 per cent. India (4.2 per cent), Sri Lanka (four per cent), Bangladesh (3.4 per cent), Bhutan (5.5 per cent), Nepal (5.8 per cent), Afghanistan (7.4 per cent) and the Maldives (eight per cent) are spending higher on education and health as a percentage of their GDPs. As a result of this, Pakistan today has the second highest number of out-ofschool children in the world and the infant mortality rate as indicated earlier is also deplorable.

The 2011 HDI shows that South Asia continues to be the cradle of human deprivation. Chronic conflicts, egregious governance, unstable democracies, malevolent natural disasters, rampant corruption, large population and a fast-depleting natural resource base are some of the maladies that preclude South Asia`s growth on the human development indicators.

Pakistan with perpetuating dictatorial regimes, punctuated by impressive spells of economic growth has yet to show its citizens political commitment. The country with its enormous human and natural capital possesses great potential for human development. However, misplaced priorities and weak political institutions have deprived the people of opportunities of growth and well-being. The country needs to veer its focus from illusive border security to the greater objective of human security by investing in its people

Intercession in Islam

INTERCESSION has become one of those controversial topics for which arguments are provided from both sides of the divide. The Quran says, `O you who believe! Fear Allah and seek a wasila to him`(5:35).

In Arabic `wasila` stands for a link, a means to an end or an intermediary. `Tawassul` or `shifa`a`, means intercession, or to seek a means to an end. It means to plead with somebody on behalf of somebody else, in this world as well as on the Day of Judgment. When the word `Shaafi`is used for God, it means one who gives permission for intercession.

Many verses have been misunderstood out of context and some people think that the Quran contradicts itself and says in some places that intercession is valid and in others that it is not.

According to the Quran, those denied intercession are the ones who did not believe, or those who transgressed: `The intercession of the intercessors will be of no use to them` (74:48), referring to those in hell. The Bani Israel are told, `Fear the Day (of Judgment when) ... No fine will be acceptable and neither will any intercession be useful` (2:123).

Some verses which make it clear that without God`s permission and promise, no one can intercede, also reassure that intercession will take place: `They will have no (claim to) intercession, except for those who have the promise of the Most Merciful` (19:87; 34:23). No one can act as intercessor except by His leave (10:3; 2:255; 21:28). `On that Day no intercession will matter other than his whom Ar-Rehman grants permission and accepts` (20:109). The Makkan belief that their idolswould intercede for them is refuted (30:13).

God tells the Prophet (PBUH): `And in the night, pray the tahajjud, which is additional for you for soon your Lord will raise you to the Station of Praise (Maqam Mehmud)` (17:79).

Recited in the middle of the night, this prayer was made obligatory for the Prophet, but is voluntary for his followers. The Prophet`s `Station of Praise` will be the highest human station on the Day of Judgment.

A hadith states that on that day people will be running to and fro looking for an intercessor, until they come to the Prophet Muhammad, who will answer, `I am for intercession`. The Lord will then ask him to `...intercede, for your intercession will be heard` (Bukhari).

One of the titles of the Prophet is `shaafi`, one who performs intercession. Other spiritual leaders who will act as intermediaries will be prophets, martyrs, huffaz of the Quran, angels and pious people whom God deems fit. Prophet Jesus` intercession for his people on the Day of Judgment is mentioned in the Quran (5:16-18).

According to Tirmidhi, Ibn Majah and others: `A blind man came to the Prophet and said: `I`ve been afflicted in my eyesight, so pray to Allah for me`. The Prophet said: `Go and perform wudu (ablution), perform two rakat salat and then say: `O Allah! I ask you and turn to you through my Prophet Muhammad, the Prophet of Mercy. O Muhammad! I seek your intercession with my Lord for the return of my eyesight, that it may be fulfilled. O Allah! Grant him intercession for me`. The Prophet then said: `And if there is some other need, do the same` Tawassul can be carried out through a living as well as a dead person, as it refers to the permanent, positive status attached to that person, living or dead. Uthmaan ibn Hunayf taught this prayer to someone long after the Prophet`s death.

Praying to God for a particular need, using some honourable personality, such as the Prophet and other righteous believers, as a wasila or intermediary, without supplicating to that person, or thinking that he has the power to provide, is permitted by the four schools of the Sunni fiqh. Even Ibn Taymiyah believed that God would allow the Prophet and the spiritual leaders to intercede for believers. Since they will be alive on Judgment Day, their intercession will be effective.

If a person supplicates directly to the deceased, believing that the prophets and pious persons are independently in possession of the power to provide, then this would be shirk or polytheism, and would be equal to assigning partners to God in his attribute of Al Razzak or The Provider.

There are various types of intercessions: first, through the beautiful names (attributes) of God `Allah has beautiful names, so call unto Him through them` (7:180). Second, through the good deeds of the person. Three people were trapped in a cave. Each made a supplication to God to accept their prayers due to some good deed that each had done (Bukhari). Third, requesting the living, righteous people to pray for them, and, four, to make tawassul to God through the rank of certain individuals in the sight of Allah, alive or dead.

A distinction between the living and the dead in this matter is like believing in the perishing of the souls at the time of death. This is tantamount to denial of resurrection. The intercession on Judgment Day will be like grace marks given by God to a believer who tried but could not come up to the desired level. It will be the pleading by one to whom God gives permission, only for the one for whom God gives permission: `In God`s power is complete intercession` (39:44), and all power belongs to God. • The writer is a scholar of the Quran, and writes on contemporary issues.

nilofar.ahmed58@gmail.com

Imagining real democracy

  By Niaz Murtaza | 11/16/2011 12:00:00 AM
AKBAR Zaidi rightly argued in this paper recently that Pakistan`s governance problems under elected governments reflect failures of particular regimes rather than democracy, since Pakistan is yet to experience genuine democracy.

What is genuine democracy? Democracy is the government of the people by the people for the people. `Of and by the people` means that state power must be attained democratically through elections. `For the people` means that power is subsequently exercised democratically. Real democracy exists only when state power is attained and exercised democratically.

The concepts of democratic transition and consolidation help in unpacking the black box of democracy further.

Democratic transition represents the first move towards democracy. i.e. a country`s first free elections with near universal suffrage, competition and acceptance. Thus, it refers to how state power is attained.

Pakistan`s democratic transition started with the `Pakistani Spring`of March 1969 which overthrew Ayub and subsequently fostered free elections with near-universal suffrage and competition. Unfortunately, the transition was imperfect as the elections results were not universally accepted and caused Pakistan`s bifurcation.

Democratic consolidation consists of democratic stability and quality.

Democratic stability occurs when democracy is accepted as the only game in town, and free elections with near-universal suffrage, competition and acceptance are held regularly. Pakistan`s post-transition history poignantly reflects its struggles with democratic stability. Half of those 40 years have been spent under military rule. The seven elections held since then have all fallen short of global standards. Democracy is still not seen as the only game in town by the military and militants. It is not clear whether this government will complete its term and whether the next government will emerge democratically.

Finally, democratic quality means that power is exercised democratically after elections. It consists of six sub-dimensions. First, the elected government`s power must not be unconstitutionally fettered, functionally or geographically.

Functionally, Pakistan`s security policy always resides with the military while donors often exercise undue influence on economic policy. Geographically, parts of Pakistan often become `no-go` for governments while many rural elites maintain their own mini-kingdoms.

Second, the flip side of power not being fettered unconstitutionally is that it should be fettered constitutionally through its distribution. Horizontally, it must be distributed across the executive, legislature, judiciary and political parties.

Vertically, it should be devolved provincially and locally. Shore of considerable power unconstitutionally, Pakistani central executives become reluctant to share further power constitutionally. While the judiciary has succeeded in wresting some constitutional power, other horizontal institutions remain powerless. The 18th Amendment represents the first salvo in achieving provincial autonomy. However, local governments, toothless even earlier, are in limbo presently.

The third requirement is the rule of law, with clear, non-discriminatory laws and an efficient justice system to apply them to public and public officials.

Pakistan still uses many anachronistic British-era laws and has added other laws which discriminate against women and minorities. While the Supreme Court has breathed fire (two-pronged) into the judicial system, lower courts do not provide efficient justice while the police are notoriously corrupt. Finally, public officials escape justice because of NAB`s dis empowerment.

Fourth, elected governments should guarantee civic liberty and equality.

Beyond discriminatory laws, large sections of Pakistan`s population, especially women and minorities, have lost these rights to non-state actors, e.g. militants and landlords. Even elected governments exhibit neither the capacity nor the willingness to redress these usurped rights.

Fifth, real democracy requires policies which enhance economic equity, i.e.

equality of opportunities for all and safety nets for the vulnerable. Beyond populist rhetoric and makeshift programmes, economic policies even under elected Pakistani governments remain elitist, with little attempt to tax the rich adequately and implement socio-economic programmes.

Sixth, real democracy requires vigorous feedback loops from the electorate to the elected in between elections. These loops include electoral mechanisms and civil society activities. Pakistani media has definitely become vigorous lately though not necessarily mature. CNN transformed news from what had hap-pened in the past to what is happening presently through on-time ground coverage. Going one step further, certain Pakistani media outlets have miraculously transformed news into what will happen in the future, through armchair analysis. Consequently, much of their news consists of predictions, e.g., about when the government will fall.

So, it seems strange to blame democracy when Pakistan has never experienced it. Clearly, high democratic quality, as defined above, could help Pakistan resolve many knotty problems, e.g. corruption and poverty. Why has Pakistan struggled to attain real democracy? Some would argue, partly validly, that the frequent interruptions of democracy have undermined its quality.

However, more crucial is the absence of certain societal characteristics, i.e.

high education, incomes, urbanisation and meritocracy. These characteristics foster democratic quality by strengthenine the feedback loops unleashed by civilsociety activities.

These factors, in turn, are facilitated by increasing economic opportunities for common people. While poor governance hampers such opportunities in Pakistan, industrious Pakistanisescape this vicious circle of stagnation by migrating abroad and subsequently sending remittances, which create further opportunities. The process will be slow but such improvised opportunities represent Pakistan`s best chance of attaining real democracy and good governance.

Any mention of the fact that Pakistan`s societal characteristics may not be immediately suitable for real democracy provides fodder to imaginative minds looking forever for alternatives. Martial law has lost charm because of its repeated failures, but a controlled form of presidential democracy where the vast majority is disqualified from not only competing but even voting seems to be the current favourite. This option seems suspiciously similar to Ayub Khan`s failed experiments.

Another favourite in some circles is the `khilafat` option. In Muslim history, righteous khilafat lasted merely a few decades. Which is more likely to emerge in today`s Pakistan? Some people never learn from history it seems. To paraphrase Thatcher`s comment about capitalism, there is no alternative to democracy. While this slogan is certainly not true about capitalism, applied to democracy, there is no escaping from this simple truth. • The writer is a political economist at the University of California, Berkeley.

Higher education, lower incomes G DR PERVEZ TAHIR

The world's financial crisis and macroeconomic dif ficulties have adversely affected funding for education in most countries. Much like in Pakistan, while students are protesting, university spokespersons fear loss of competitive edge in knowledge-driven economies. In the process, some interesting analyses have emerged. Here in Cambridge this week, Haroon Chowdry of the Institute of Fiscal Studies in London made an interesting presentation on the funding crisis in the UK. Proposals like a graduate tax have been mooted.
Escalating costs have raised concerns about the impact on lower income groups. These groups are already underrepresented in universities, something that is very much in evidence in Pakistan. It should be obvious that higher costs would restrict access to higher education for students hailing from low-income groups. However, the presentation found a weak relationship between income and participation rates. Access to higher education is determined by the quality of pre-university education. In other words, if the poor go to bad schools, their grades will be no different.
Our own Higher Education Commission (HEC) lists quality, access and relevance -in that order -as the challenges it must face. While quality and relevance have not moved beyond rhetoric, the focus has been on access. This is not surprising as access is quantitatively defined and is related by the HEC to the physical expansion of universities, which itself is a function of government funding. As physical expansion slows down following deep budgetary cuts by a government repeatedly failing to keep its fiscal deficit within manageable limits, the HEC fears that the present lamentably low access is likely to stagnate or even fall. Access to university education is estimated at 5.1 per cent of the relevant age group. Education Policy 2009 fixes this target at 10 per cent for 2015.
But this policy also wants expenditure on education to go up to 7 per cent of GDP by 2015. If the future is guided by the present, 7 per cent of GDP looks more like the tax-to-GDP ratio of 2015! On average, public expenditure on higher education in countries that are part of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development is one per cent of GDP. The UK is below this average at 0.6 per cent. Poor Pakistan has been spending about half of it.
But whose access is the concern of the HEC? One has not seen any serious analysis. There is a casual mention in the mission statement that the “HEC will improve equitable access through establishing campuses and universities in backward areas, in providing financial assistance to needy students and in introducing soft disciplines, such as social sciences, media and journalism, and fine arts to cater more to the female population so gender parity is further reduced.“ As can be seen, the HEC would achieve equitable access through physical expansion, albeit in backward areas. Physical access is the idea, no matter how backward the university. Interestingly, the HEC wants to improve gender equity by reducing `gender parity'. If this were inattention to detail, calling social sciences, media and fine arts “soft disciplines“ meant for women reminds one of the long discarded `sewing machine' view of gender justice, which stereotypes them, even as it seeks to empower them. The writer, a former chief economist of the Planning Commission, is at present based at Cambridge pervez.tahir@tribune.com.pk

Rotten fruits of democracy

By Jalees Hazir | Published: October 9, 2011

The MQM is back in the fold of the coalition government and would like us to believe that it has taken the decision in national interest. Similarly, the PML-Q's reservations regarding the government and the resignations of its ministers submitted in the last party meeting, disappeared in thin air after telephonic assurances were given to the party head by President Zardari. Once again, the government has a comfortable majority in the National Assembly and the partners in power are all set to benefit from cooperation in the upcoming Senate elections, which will help them rake in more seats in the upper house. In the midst of the routine wheeling and dealing for petty partisan interests that has become a hallmark of democratic politics in the country, the Supreme Court announced its judgement in the suo moto case on the Karachi situation, giving us hope that all is not rotten in the State of Pakistan.
‘National Interest’ is the magic term employed by political leadership of all hues to explain away their unexplainable somersaults and marriages of convenience. Take the case of PML-Q for instance. Senior leaders and parliamentarians from the party bitterly criticised the unpopular government and questioned the political wisdom of being a part of it. The ministers belonging to the party were not happy for another reason; they felt that they did not enjoy the power to run their ministries the way they would have liked to and that they were being denied the instruments of power and patronage that being in government brings with it. So what were the assurances that President Zardari gave to Chaudhry Shujaat that convinced him to shelve the reservations of his party and jump back into the government's lap? Was he told that the PML-Q ministers would be given the power, privileges and patronage possibilities that they were complaining about? Or did the President enlighten him about secret rabbits in his magic hat, policies that would make the PPP-led government popular and hence not such a bad thing to be a part of?
For all we know, the discussion could have been about completely different matters. The PPP critics would say that their conversation on the telephone had nothing to do with either of the two issues, but revolved around Moonis Elahi and his troubles, and what the government would do to alleviate them. On the other hand, PPP jiyalas would swear by the reconciliation charm of their big boss and talk about saving the system and democracy from undemocratic forces. Reporters hobnobbing with those in the power circle and armed with unnamed, but reliable sources would come up with inside information and tell us a juicier story. Since the main characters of the story don't feel accountable to the people they represent, and do not feel that they owe the nation some explanation, the people of Pakistan would be left to themselves to draw their own conclusions.
The contents of the dialogue between the PPP and MQM, and the dynamics of their on-again, off-again cooperation is similarly left to the imagination of shocked citizens, carefully decided in meetings between ace negotiators conducted behind closed doors and clouded by a smokescreen of statements that mean nothing. There is no word about Dr Zulfiqar Mirza's serious allegations, no attempt by the MQM to clear itself of specific charges he levelled against the party and no desire on part of the PPP to probe Rehman Malik whose dubious role in the Karachi crisis was boldly challenged by the former Sindh Home Minister. The two parties have obviously come to some understanding about sharing power, but they would not like us to know about the terms of that understanding. As they play their power games, they would like an uninformed electorate to have trust in them and play along.
Meanwhile, the opposition parties are divided due to their own petty partisan interests and are unable or unwilling to agree on a national agenda that addresses the problems of governance. There is a readiness on their part to raise issues of public importance, but there is no effort to enter into a dialogue with each other to create a consensus on the way out of the impossible situation that the citizens find themselves in. They raise a hue and cry about excessive loadshedding when the desperate citizens can't take it anymore and come out on the streets of our cities in violent protests against the insensitivity of the government. They shed tears about the plight of people displaced by floods. They make loud noises about the government selling out to the US interests. But they wouldn't cooperate on developing a strategy to put pressure on the government to address these issues or to throw it out.
So the democracy circus continues, as the problems confronting the nation mount. The political leadership continues in its power games that have lost all relevance to the public and its issues. The political bosses are deaf, even to the conscientious objectors within their parties, who bring their attention to their responsibility to the people and the dangerous outcome of the games they play. And when other, more democratically evolved institutions like the Supreme Court and the independent media manage to bring a perspective informed by the national interest into focus, they scuttle the possibility of acting in the direction by drowning out these voices of sanity in their loud partisan squabbles that are only aimed at point-scoring and furthering their petty political objectives. Interestingly, they would like the citizens to swear by democracy as an article of faith. Why would they?
The argument that our democracy has problems because it has been interrupted too often does not hold. We need to look deeper into the malaise of a system that is supposed to represent the interests of the people, but ends up bolstering the fortunes of the political elite and its privileged sponsors. After all, the system of democracy has had a smooth sailing in the US. Yet, the Occupy-Wall-Street initiative has unleashed an angry movement in that country against a system that the American citizens feel doesn't represent them. The students, labour unions, the unemployed, and the underprivileged and even conscientious citizens, who have not suffered directly due to the pro-rich and pro-war policies of their democratic government, are out on the streets to challenge a system that benefits a small minority at the expense of the vast majority. It is unlikely that they could be convinced that a few more elections would make things fall in their right democratic place.
The writer is an independent columnist.
Email: hazirjalees@hotmail.com

Pakistan – the way forward

Atta-ur-Rahman

We live in an age in which natural resources have diminishing importance. Knowledge has become the single most important factor for socio-economic development. Countries that have realised that their real wealth lies in their children and invested massively in education, science, engineering and innovation have surged forward, leaving others behind. Just one company of Finland (Nokia), a country with a population about one-fourth of Karachi, has exports that are double the entire exports of Pakistan! Singapore, also with a similarly small population, has exports of $351 billion, almost 18 times those of Pakistan. South Korea revamped its educational system, laying emphasis on higher education, science and technology, and increased its university enrolment from five percent of the age group in 1960 to 92 percent of the same age group in 2010. The result was an astonishing increase in its exports, from $32 billion in 1960 to $466 billion by 2010. (Pakistan’s exports stagnate at about $20 billion.) What went wrong in Pakistan? Since its formation in 1947 Pakistan has been facing one crisis after another. It is oscillating between successive democratic and military regimes. Regular military interventions were necessitated by corrupt governments which looted and plundered at will whenever they got an opportunity to do so, putting to shame the vision of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah of a progressive, modern Pakistan. The military governments failed to punish those criminal politicians and bureaucrats who amassed vast fortunes abroad. In contrast, India brought in genuine land reforms and, guided by the vision of Jawaharlal Nehru, gave the highest emphasis to education, science and technology. In contrast, Pakistan – where a robust middle class did not emerge because of the absence of land reforms – has developed one of the worst school systems in the world. The powerfully entrenched feudals, who have a stranglehold on the cabinets and parliaments, gave education the lowest importance, with Pakistan spending only 1.2 percent of its GDP, which makes it comparable to Bhutan, Nepal or Togo. We are now ranked among the bottom 10 countries of the world in terms of investments in education, a shameful fact about a nuclear power. The result has been an illiterate and lawless nation, drowning in foreign loans while the powerful loot and plunder. What, then, is the way forward? Clearly, the British parliamentary system of democracy has been an abject failure. Military rule is also not an answer. Learning from bitter experiences, we need to adopt a system of governance which will root out and prevent corruption and promote the development of a strong knowledge economy. The following key proposals are made in this connection: 1. Governance Reforms: We need to bring in constitutional and governance reforms by abolishing the present parliamentary form of democracy (which is bringing up largely corrupt politicians – 51 were found to have forged degrees and the degrees of another 250 are suspect) and replace it with a presidential form of democracy. The cabinet ministers, who should be eminent experts in their respective fields, could then be appointed directly on merit by the president (who will be the chief executive), from outside parliament. The Constitution will need to be changed to make this happen. The revised Constitution should also ensure that parliamentarians are highly educated, as their primary job is lawmaking. Government secretaries should all be persons of international repute in the fields in which they are holding secretarial positions, and be selected on merit after open competition. The above measures will ensure that there will always be a competent government of technocrats. The positions of president, secretaries and parliamentarians should be screened by an Eminent Citizens Committee to be appointed by judges of the Supreme Court for “suitability” prior to their election/appointment. Persons judged by this committee as having “doubtful reputation” should not be allowed to contest any elections or hold any key positions in government or in government-controlled institutions. The heads and members of the boards of governors of public-sector organisations (PIA, the Steel Mills, etc.), as well as of such organisations as the Federal Board of Revenue, the FIA, the NAB, should be appointed by their respective boards of governors on merit after screening by the Eminent Citizens Committee, and not by the government. They should work as completely autonomous organisations reporting to their own eminent boards of governors and not to any government ministry or official. It is notable that the former federal minister of finance, Mr Shaukat Tareen, estimated corruption of Rs500 billion annually in the FBR alone! 2. Education: If we are to rid ourselves of the crushing poverty and the huge national debt, we must develop a robust knowledge economy. This is only possible if we make necessary amendments to our Constitution to force our decision-makers to give education the highest national priority. Malaysia has been investing 30 percent of its budget for the last 30 years – we must by a constitutional requirement do the same. The only way out for Pakistan from its myriad difficulties – law and order problems, corruption, non-functional democracy, poverty, industrial stagnation, etc. – is to make quality education the launching pad for a new Pakistan. With about 90 million young people below the age of 19, we have a tremendous potential human resource. This offers a unique opportunity for development. If we empower this huge young workforce with quality education and training, and provide opportunities for jobs in key economic sectors, then a wonderful future lies ahead. If we don’t, then this can become a stifling burden that will only lead to massive poverty, frustrations and crime. Massive investments in education at all levels will allow us to develop the knowledge workers that are needed in high-tech industries – engineering goods, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology products, metallurgy, information technology, electronics, high value-added agriculture products, defence goods etc. – so that we can compete in the comity of nations. A national technology policy directed at achievement of national self-reliance needs to be formulated and implemented so that we become a major global exporter of high-tech products. 3. Prompt Access to Justice: We must punish the corrupt and those responsible for terrorism. The normal legal system has failed in this respect, because of the life threats to judges and witnesses by the powerful, the corrupt and terrorists. This has to be initially done under independent military courts until cleanup is achieved and a proper functional police force is established. Those who have amassed vast amounts of national wealth in foreign lands must be forced to return it to the nation and spend the rest of their lives in jails. A major overhaul of the justice system would be needed, including a mandatory requirement that court decisions are made within three months by strengthening the courts. This will need to be accompanied by genuine land reforms and abolition of the patwari system through computerisation of land records, our courts are choked by land disputes. The decision is ours to make as a nation. We have the natural and human resources and creative, hardworking people. The dream of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the father of our nation, can become a reality if we are courageous and set a new path for ourselves through the above reforms. The writer is former federal minister for science and technology, former chairman of the Higher Education Commission. Email: ibne_sina@ hotmail.com

August 8, 2011

SNAPSHOT

Turkey's General Dilemma

Democracy and the Reverse Coup
Omer Taspinar
OMER TASPINAR is Professor of National Security at the National War College and a nonresident Senior Fellow at Brookings’ Center on the United States and Europe.The days of military coups in Turkey are officially over. Half of all Turkish admirals and one out of ten active duty generals are currently in jail for plotting against the government, and on July 29 the military's chief of staff resigned over a disagreement with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan about staff promotions. The same day, the heads of the army, navy, and air force requested early retirement. These developments are a paradigm shift for a country that has experienced constant military meddling and three military coups in the last half century.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of last week's events was that they did not cause any public uproar or panic. Turkey's stock exchange opened to gains last Monday, and the government seems to be going about its business as usual. This is unexpected, as Turkey's armed forces have traditionally been well respected. The military was the first institution of the Ottoman Empire to modernize, adopting Western military strategy, weapons, as well as science and education methods. Almost all modern Turkey's hallowed founding fathers -- the Young Turks and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk -- were military officers determined to westernize and secularize Turkey's government, laws, education system, and even its clothes and alphabet.
Of course, Atatürk's cultural revolution was not universally embraced, especially among the pious rural masses. As a Kemalist slogan from the 1920s put it, the Turkish government ruled "for the people, despite the people." In the 1920s, the military had to suppress more than a dozen Kurdish and religious uprisings. These experiences traumatized the young republic's military leaders and left them suspicious of all things Kurdish and Islamic.
For the officers, then, democracy was a gamble. Kemalism had given the republic a secularist and nationalist political structure. According to the military, this political structure was the "realm of the state" and had to be protected from the "realm of politics." In other words, politics had to be properly monitored to prevent the rise of Islamism or other factions that would not uphold the republic's fundamental principles.
In 1960, 1971, and 1980, Turkey's powerful military launched coups to defend the realm of the state. In 1960, it intervened because it thought the government had become too authoritarian; in 1971 and 1980, it acted to put a stop to rising socialism. And in 1997, the army pushed Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan out of office in the name of defending secularism. Until recently, the military still routinely interfered in politics through the National Security Council, where the top brass exerted considerable political influence over the civilian cabinet.
The story of the military's fall is also the story of the consolidation of power of Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP). Although its roots lay in a banned Islamist party, the AKP was allowed to participate in national elections in 2002. Its victory that year was followed by a tense détente with the military that lasted until 2007. That year, Erdogan nominated Abdullah Gül, a well-respected foreign minister, to the post of president -- a position that, for the military, represented the last inviolable bastion of Kemalist secularism. For the generals, the move crossed a red line. In their eyes, Gül -- a man who once flirted with political Islam and whose wife wears a head scarf -- posed an existential threat to Atatürk's republic.
Soon after Erdogan announced the nomination, Yasar Büyükanit, the Turkish chief of staff, staged what a dumbfounded press dubbed an "e-coup." He posted a warning on the Turkish military's official Web site stating that "if necessary, the Turkish Armed Forces will not hesitate to make their position and stance abundantly clear as the absolute defenders of secularism." His note was a thinly veiled threat that a conventional coup might be in the offing.

Instead of backing off, Erdogan defied the military and called early elections, which he won with a landslide 47 percent of the vote. He appealed to the democratic instincts of the Turkish people and touted his economic record. (Between 2003 and 2007, the AKP government had doubled the country's per capita income, significantly improved its democratic record, and begun accession negotiations with the European Union.) Erdogan quickly swore in Gül as president, and Gül promised to abide by Turkey's secular principles and continue to steer the country toward the European Union. Even so, the top brass refused to salute him during his inaugural visit to parliament and stayed away from his oath-taking ceremony.

Since 2007, the Turkish economy has continued to grow, unemployment is at a record low, and Turkey's global stature has reached new heights. As revolutions shook the Middle East in the spring, reformers in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia cited Turkey as a model democracy. Last June, the AKP won its third consecutive electoral victory, this time with 50 percent of the vote.

In a sense, the generals' resignation was the next logical step in Turkey's political maturation; no true democracy can place the military's will above the people's. But troublingly, the country remains deeply polarized, with members of the opposition ever more concerned about creeping authoritarianism and Islamism. They call the government a civilian dictatorship and deplore its use of the judicial system to neuter the military, the opposition media, and rival political parties.

At the heart of the opposition's argument is a court case against Ergenekon, a shadowy organization with possible ties to the military. The judiciary launched the case in 2007, shortly after AKP's second electoral victory, claiming that Ergenekon had planned a coup. The prosecutor of the case accused hundreds of military officials, journalists, and political activists of being involved. According to leaked documents about the case, the Ergenekon network was allegedly behind a number of bombings and assassinations. It planned to use the chaos as a pretext for a coup.

The main problem with the case is that it has yet to reach a verdict despite the arrest of hundreds of suspects. Critics of the AKP argue that the government is using the case to silence its secular opponents, but the AKP responds that it does not control the judiciary and has itself been the court's regular target; in 2008, the constitutional court came close to banning the AKP party and Erdogan from politics for promoting an Islamist agenda.

Two week's ago, after the military's plans were revealed to appoint or promote 250 soldiers and officers who are awaiting hearings as part of the Ergenekon trial, Erdogan announced that he would not allow the military's scheme to go forward. This prompted the spate of military resignations. The fact that the generals chose to bow out rather than fight Erdogan's decision signals just how much power has shifted from the military to civilians. For his part, Erdogan swiftly named General Necdet Ozel acting chief of staff and commander of ground forces.

Supporters of Erdogan and his party, the AKP, argue that the resignation of the commanders is a sign of Turkish democracy's new maturity and its embrace of Western-style civilian supremacy over the military. Detractors, however, express serious concern about the disappearance of checks and balances that they believe have kept civilian governments from becoming authoritarian.
In fact, Turkey is not yet a liberal democracy. But it is certainly moving in the right direction. Those who argue that the military was an essential check on civilian politics should understand that Turkey is now becoming a "normal" democracy, where elections, public opinion, opposition parties, the parliament, the media, and civil society all exert more power. And unlike the military, these institutions have a legitimate role to play in politics.

Meanwhile, in order to prove that Turkey is not becoming more authoritarian, Erdogan must address the critical challenges facing the country -- the Kurdish question, human rights, and freedom of expression -- by creating a more democratic constitution. If he fails, he will have only himself to blame. For the first time in the republic's history, Turkey's performance is totally in the civilians' hands.

Copyright © 2002-2010 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

Creating more provinces?

Creating more provinces?

Multiculturalism and postmodernity: a challenge to our political structures

Ger Mennens, 05th August 2011

Mono-cultural nationalism can no longer provide us with the national identities we need. The formation of multi-cultural civic identities requires a new way of drawing our political maps.

About the author

Ger Mennens LLM MA is a lawyer and social scientist, who has worked at Maastricht University and is interested in minority rights, issues of democracy and political culture.

Multiculturalism demands a politics of recognition. It implies that the cultural identity of ethnic and national minorities should be recognized, and that these minority cultures should have specific rights in order to express and maintain their culture. Therefore, politics and culture should not be two separate spheres. In multiculturalism, politics actively interferes in culture. In liberalism, however, culture and politics are seen as separated. The liberal principle of benign neglect means that the State should hold a neutral position when it comes to culture. “Culture” belongs exclusively to private life. Charles Taylor rightly states that this principle is untenable, since both State and politics are always culturally embedded. Politics itself is a cultural practice, in which norms and values play an important role. Therefore culture cannot exclusively belong to private life: culture is also a part of the political arena, there is no line between politics and culture. This is a postmodernist conception of the relationship between such categories as society, arts, science, and politics.
Postmodernism problematizes the existence of fixed borders between categories that are traditionally seen as strictly separated. Take, for instance, the sharp distinction between science and politics. Science is always performed through the eyes of individuals who hold certain values and norms, and therefore cannot be unbiased. The categories are no longer separated but have become hybrid.
Max Weber argued that politics is in an isolated world of rational top-down decision-making, which exclusively belongs to the political sector. Through legal procedures within an efficient and effective bureaucracy, policy provides blueprints which are then applied ready-made to a distinct and separate sector: society. But this rational view of the machinery of bureaucracy, the cause and effect of its rules and regulations, no longer works. It is not possible to make blueprints centrally and top-down. Nowadays, in order to win support for your blueprints, for rules and regulations, negotiations are needed within a broad field of interest groups. Several actors who have concerns in a specific policy area will demand to have a place at the negotiating table. Policy measures will only win that support if the actors feel that they can influence the outcome of the policies that affect them. So, the blueprints are being constructed bottom-up as well. In this middle range of meso-politics, the outcome of any given blueprint is no longer a fixed product, but rather changes in the enactment. Political goals are no longer reached through modernist rationality, they are reached through participation. This is a network of actors, who all have their own goals, and who deal and negotiate in order to reach compromises. In this postmodern world we see society and politics as intermixed, just as in our multicultural world we see that culture and politics are intermixed. The politics of multiculturalism requires this network approach.
The concept of postmodernity is part of a normative theory relating to empirical reality. Latour’s ‘we have never been modern’ is a statement that is descriptive as well as prescriptive. Multiculturalism can succeed in states that have postmodern network societies. But it will not work in states that are still stuck with modernist top-down decision-making governments. There is a strong connection between multiculturalism and postmodernism. Both, as practice and as norm, reject totalizing and universal concepts, and instead recognise difference and pluralism. Both reject Platonic absolutism and embrace relativism.
Enlightenment concepts of rationalism, centralism and monoculture have to be replaced by notions of diffusion,negotiation and diversity in order to make multiculturalism work successfully. In modernism, national identity presupposes nationalism and vice versa. Nineteenth century nationalism, as an aspect of modernity, went hand in hand with nation-building and drew on the Enlightenment notion that states can be engineered. In these days, notions of nation-building around a group identity are being replaced by notions of globalisation, individualism and diffusion. In Canada, nationalism and national identity are not the same, because there is no official ethnic or national majority group. This does not mean that there are no majority identity groups within Canada, but that Canadian politics has explicitly opted for not choosing one ethnic group as dominant. This is one example, a model, of how to make multiculturalism work. Canadian nationalism celebrates diversity, minority languages and minority cultures. The Canadian identity is officially multicultural. Multiculturalism in Canada articulates the ideology of a non-nation.
Given that postmodernity is a condition for successful multiculturalism, states that largely rely on party-democracies will have difficulty in adapting to multiculturalism, and fostering a politics of multiculturalism. Party democracies still make a strict modernistic distinction between culture (society) and politics. In the field of decision-making, politics has a monopoly. Policy exclusively belongs in the hands of those who are members of, or who belong to, specific political parties. Societal actors do not participate in politics and are excluded. Decision-making is not understood as taking place within a network of actors; it is imposed from the top down upon society in general, with a political party as the central actor.
Only a strong civic culture within society can break this division between politics and society. A meso-political level is needed in order to create successful multiculturalism: ethnic and many other minorities within a strong civic society can then become actors that take part in the processes of decision-making. In this way, blueprints for society are co-created with support from all the actors within this network, without any cultural group finding themselves completely excluded.
Party democracies, however, rely on the notion that they can engineer societies rationally top down, without letting all identity groups participate. States are becoming more and more diverse through processes of globalisation and immigration, yet party democracies still act according to the principles of the Enlightenment as professed in modernism. With the move away from mono-ethnic nationalism, we must reshape the political system.
Territorial autonomy, or decentralisation, if well designed, is one way to ensure the involvement of minorities in the network of decision-making. Such politics can be adapted to multi-ethnic and multi-national states in which minority groups are geographically concentrated. In case such groups are not geographically concentrated, a system should be designed according to the model of 'grand coalitions', a system of policy-making in which all identity groups have representatives inside government.

Building stable and peaceful states

Building stable and peaceful states: a new framework for international action?

Erwin van Veen, 

07th July 2011

It is time to reframe the development discourse on conflict and fragility. A set of international objectives is needed that complements the MDGs to lead efforts to reduce conflict and fragility. But that is not enough. Making this happen will put the leadership, credibility and energies both of fragile countries and international actors to the test.

About the author

Erwin van Veen works as policy analyst on peace and security for the OECD’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility

“Goodbye conflict, welcome development” was the slogan that the Timorese splashed all over Dili in 2010 to stimulate and celebrate the increasing stability, quality of governance and prospects of their country. It was not always so. The city saw waves of fighting and rioting as recently as 2006, which could only be resolved by another international intervention. This was four years after independence and seven years after the Timorese war for independence. It was once more made painfully clear that the citizens, leaders and international partners of countries emerging from conflict opr fragility, need to get fundamental issues such as inclusive politics and basic security sorted before they can have much hope of further development.

The global challenge

This experience is by no means unique to Timor-Leste. The country rather reflects the more ‘benign’ tip of a proverbial iceberg. Today, about 30-40 countries worldwide find themselves in a situation of fragility and conflict. For instance, over 70% of all countries considered fragile (according to various indices) have experienced conflict since 1989. What is worse, these countries tend to stay fragile. The damage lasts or can recur easily: once conflict has occurred, the chance of relapse is high (estimated around 40-50%). More than 1.5 billion people are caught in conflict and poverty traps. The global cost of violent conflicts in an interdependent world, must be measured not only in the form of human suffering and physical destruction, but also organized crime and illicit financial flows. Fragility and conflict are development in reverse.
The 2015 Milennium Development Goals (MDG) are the leading international policy response to underdevelopment. They embody our understanding of a more developed world with less hunger, more opportunities, better health and more knowledge. The trouble is that as a framework for focus and action, according to the World Bank, for instance, not a single Low Income Country that is fragile has realized any one of the MDGs so far.
The leading international policy response to violent insecurity is a range of more or less intrusive interventions (spanning mediation, sanctions and peace enforcement). Although the dramatic increase in the number of peacekeeping and peacemaking initiatives after 1990 has played a major role in reducing conflicts, their success rates are modest while the international community seems much less skilled at peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts, as several recent contributions in this forum have highlighted (for instance: Carpenter [7] on Sudan, Alaaldin [8] on Afghanistan and Muggah [9] on Haiti).
In the light of this widening disparity in security, quality of governance and wealth, conflict and fragility continue to represent a serious problem – impacting on the lives of millions every day. Is it therefore time, as Vernon and Baskh [10] have suggested,“to reframe the development discourse?”.
It is. In fact, for conflict and fragility there are two frames that need to be put in place. One is a set of objectives that complements the MDGs to lead efforts to reduce conflict and fragility, the other is a set of commitments on what needs to change in the way international and national actors currently do business in such settings. Creating these frames will put the leadership, credibility and energies both of fragile countries and international actors to the test.

International peacebuilding objectives

The High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (South-Korea), planned for November 2011, offers an opportunity to take a first step in establishing a set of peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives that can serve as a more effective and more relevant framework to guide (inter)national political focus, action and resources in addressing conflict and fragility.
To realize this opportunity, about 150 leaders and representatives of donor organizations, multilaterals and around 15 fragile states (called the g7+, which includes e.g. Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nepal, Liberia and Timor-Leste), have recently taken a long and hard look at what matters most in these countries. In June they met in Monrovia to compare notes, at the second meeting of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding [11]. On the basis of their combined experiences and evidence, they argue that there are five priorities:

• Legitimate politics: Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution. For instance, the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) in Sudan and the national reconciliation accord (Taif agreement) in Lebanon once laid the hopeful foundations for a new political order. 
• Security: Establish and strengthen citizen security. In places like Burundi and Liberia, ensuring security for citizens was a key factor in consolidating peace after years of war. Only with greater security do trade, farming and investment become worthwhile. 
• Economic foundations: Generate employment and improve livelihoods. For instance, investment in economic growth helped Mozambique sustain peace after its conflict. 
• Justice: Address injustices and support increasing citizen access to justice. Only because of a strong emphasis on addressing injustices and on reconciliation is Rwanda where it is today. 
• Revenues and services: Manage revenues and build capacity for accountable and fair social service delivery. 

These “Monrovia peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives” can provide key markers on the road to the MDGs. The aim is to have them drive most of the international action and funding related to conflict and fragility. This is ambitious. However, as the Liberian president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, pointed out, "the challenges are huge, but they're not bigger than the challenges we've faced in the past".

Changing how we do business 

Yet, a new set of international policy goals will not be enough. What is also in need of urgent change are the ways in which international and national partners do business to reduce conflict and fragility. A lot of work has been done recently (including by the World Bank, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding and the OECD) to identify key factors in the success or failure of international and national initiatives helping countries emerge from conflict. A challenging set of messages is emerging for aid actors, bilaterals, multilaterals and governments of fragile states alike, pointing as they do to a continuing gap between (inter)national policy and practice. They call for five major changes:
First, get to grips with the context. Understanding sources of fragility and conflict, how state and society interact and what interests and incentives look like, is critical. It helps define core challenges, priorities and what sort of change is feasible. Donors in particular often do not have the time, patience or resources to do this. The typical programme assessment on the basis of which amounts in the order of 20 million Euro can be spent, takes about 3 weeks. In Monrovia, leaders endorsed nationally-led assessments of the features and degrees of fragility as a basis for national strategies and plans. Such assessment would need to be endorsed by national and international partners so that sufficient inclusiveness and buy-in can be secured.
Second, focus on what works. International actors need to stop transferring political and institutional models from rich to poor countries. Building a centralized state in Afghanistan after centuries of decentralized governance is, for instance, unlikely to work. National actors need to acknowledge and nurture local forms of governance and service provision where these are legitimate and effective.
Third, prioritize. Objectives must focus on political settlements, security, justice, economic growth and revenue management – and be limited in number. Successful transitions are those that have focused on two or three strategic objectives at any given time. In particular national governments need to increase space, leadership and support for inclusive political dialogue to develop a national vision, manage conflict peacefully and build confidence. Country-level agreements (or compacts) between a government and its international partners can define joint priorities, targets, measures of progress and ways to manage risks
Fourth, international engagement needs to be long-term to contribute meaningfully to results. The World Bank recently demonstrated that it can take a good 20-40 years to move from fragility to resilience. Support must be of equal duration on the basis of a political relationship of trust, negotiation and frank criticism. Donors must stop flicking the on/off switch of aid when the next corruption scandal emerges. A more nuanced approach, and response, are needed. Clearly, partners in fragile states need to help make this possible through the quality of their leadership, policies and implementation.
Fifth, the global dimension of conflict and fragility must be better taken into account. Countries do not develop in isolation but face global opportunities and stresses. Competing objectives between international trade, development and security policies have a price that needs to be acknowledged. Fragile or ungoverned spaces can enable forces that operate with a global and violent agenda.

Implementation

Implementing such responses will require leadership, rigour and courage. Three challenges stand out:
To start with, how can donors and multilaterals muster the resolve and leadership to gradually address this change agenda in the face of the current economic downturn and climate of populism in some countries? It will need courageous leaders with resolve to engage in domestic debate with parliaments and internationally with development partners. Fragile states must play their part as long-term commitments cannot come for free or without principles of partnership.
Second, how can g7+ countries build the capacity and vision in their often fragmented societies with fractured institutions? International partners can help with programmes, funds and expertise, but the direction and the drive need to come from within. The challenge (and opportunity) for the g7+ is to demonstrate it can give a common international voice to fragile states, and also support action for implementation.
Finally, practical implementation requires seasoned change agents, managers and leaders that want to work for feasible solutions. Details will matter more than rhetoric. Procurement and financial processes will need to change, new actors need to be involved and difficult, concrete discussions need to take place on risk, results and accountability. Implementation will also need a framework of joint accountability that is detailed, practical and that sets out the consequences of non-adherence.
In short, progress is being made to improve the international response to conflict and fragility. Yet it is only a promising beginning, as in Timor-Leste. With its increased security, stability and employment, it can cautiously start thinking about how to improve education, healthcare and how to further boost its economy and governance. If it is also bravely helping to lead the efforts of this international dialogue, this is to avoid others having to go through similar traumas.

Op-Eds/Articles / Arab Politics

Democracy Uprisings Should Herald a New Dawn of Education Reform

Muhammad Faour Los Angeles Times, June 10, 2011

As the popular uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia, and other Arab countries achieve their primary goal of changing the political regime, they will soon face the urgent need to reform the education system as well as the economy.
Consolidation of political democracy and economic liberalization requires citizens who have appropriate knowledge, skills and values. As states democratize, good governance will promote quality education, an objective that most Arab education systems have failed to achieve.
Despite the rapid expansion in primary and secondary education, Arab schools continue to have high dropout and repetition rates, with graduates lacking the required skills and knowledge to compete successfully in the global job market or to pursue quality higher education.
Curriculum in most Arab states tends to be didactic, teacher-directed, and does little to foster critical thinking skills and creativity.
Shortages of qualified teachers, low levels of learning achievement as demonstrated by test scores, weaknesses in national learning assessments, and a lack of public accountability also plague many Arab education systems.
Students' academic performance is generally low, as demonstrated by the results of international tests. Students in the fourth and eighth grades who participated in the TIMSS international tests in mathematics and science in 2003 and 2007 scored, on average, significantly below average.
Fourth-graders who participated in the PISA test on reading, mathematics, and science in 2003 and 2009 performed at a similar level. Fifteen-year-old students from the Arab states who took the PIRLS international test on reading achievement in 2006 also scored well below average.
Arab states currently undergoing popular unrest have shown a weak political commitment to produce independent, creative, responsible students, as such citizens may be more likely to challenge authority — be it political, religious, or traditional. Such education systems are generally unwilling to promote social values that flourish in democratic societies. As a result, teachers do not give voice to diverse opinions, dulling attempts at informed debate and limiting citizens’ capacity to reform their governments.
Political reform in the emerging Arab democracies needs citizens who have mastered 21st century skills in their ways of thinking (innovation, critical thinking, problem-solving, decision-making, and life-long learning); ways of working (communication and collaboration); tools for working (information literacy and information and communication technology, or ICT literacy); and ways of living in the world (local and global citizenship, and personal and social responsibility, including cultural awareness). The concepts of citizenship, empowerment, and community engagement are emerging as educational priorities for democracies.
Education for citizenship is an essential component of education reform. It encompasses knowledge and understanding of civics and the opportunities for participation in civil society, as well as ways in which the citizen may interact with and shape his or her own community and society. A responsible citizen may be defined as one who knows his or her legal rights and duties and how to contribute to the common good, and who can apply this knowledge to evaluate or justify the government’s policies and practices. Responsible citizenship, along with other civic values and attitudes, is first taught by parents, then by schools, starting in preschool or in primary grades.
Educating young Arabs for citizenship requires much more fundamental reform than what has so far been undertaken in education reform plans. It requires getting past several serious shortcomings in the Arab education and political systems.
These shortcomings begin at the individual student level, including low learning achievement; lack of creative, independent, and critical thinking; and lack of problem-solving skills. They also include the home or family level, which is often guided by authoritarianism, obedience to authority figures, limited freedom of expression, and dependence on a family network for prospective employment.
The shortcomings extend to the school level, where students are hindered by a lack of school autonomy, ineffective and traditional management, teacher-directed curriculum, a focus on knowledge of facts and concepts rather than analysis and critical thinking, a shortage of qualified teachers and learning resources, the absence of open discussions in classrooms, and limited opportunities for participation in governance processes.
More broadly, education challenges exist in the local community, with the dominance of authoritarian values, limited opportunities for participation in governance processes and decision making, constraints on freedom of speech and belief, and strong loyalty to one’s ethnic and/or religious group. Finally, at the national level, problems include poor governance in the ministries of education, nondemocratic regimes, a prevalence of corruption and lack of public accountability, constraints on freedom of speech and belief, fear of repression, substantial percentages of public workers who depend on the state for their livelihoods, and high rates of illiteracy and school dropouts in several countries.
To overcome those shortcomings, new democracies in the Arab world should be committed to comprehensive education reform, but particularly to citizenship education. Their governments should work with highly motivated educational practitioners from these countries and elicit support from community stakeholders at the school, local, and district levels, and from society at large.

Source: http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=44555

How new is Egypt’s “new” foreign policy?

Editor's Note: Barak Barfi is a research fellow at the New America Foundation.  You can read more from Barak Barfi at Project Syndicate and be sure to check it out on Facebook and Twitter.

By Barak Barfi

CAIRO – In the months since Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation, his successors have signaled a shift in foreign policy by reaching out to former adversaries.

Egypt’s government has welcomed Iranian diplomats and embraced the Palestinian group Hamas. Many interpret such moves as clear evidence of Egypt’s desire for a diplomacy that is not subordinate to American interests.

But Mubarak never entirely fit his detractors’ portrayal of him as an American lackey. In fact, Mubarak’s need to please his Saudi Arabian benefactors, not the United States, was paramount in his thinking. Although he sometimes supported American policies, Mubarak frequently rebuffed the U.S. when its positions did not align with his own.
Since the end of the October 1973 war, Arab-Israeli peace has been a cornerstone of America’s Middle East agenda. The U.S. often looked to Egypt, the most important and influential Arab country, to play a leading role in promoting this goal. And, when it suited him, Mubarak played his part. When the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat humiliated Mubarak before the U.S. Secretary of State and the international media by refusing to sign an annex to an Israeli-Palestinian accord brokered in Cairo, Mubarak told him, “Sign it, you son of a dog!”
On the other hand, when Arab public opinion opposed Palestinian concessions, Mubarak remained aloof from U.S. peace initiatives. For example, in 1996, he declined President Bill Clinton’s invitation to come to Washington, along with Arafat and the leaders of Israel and Jordan, to settle a bout of Palestinian violence. And when Clinton asked Mubarak to pressure Arafat to facilitate an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal during negotiations at Camp David in 2000, he refused.
Mubarak had a rocky relationship with Israel, and held America’s closest Middle East ally at arm’s length throughout his presidency.
For almost ten of his 30 years in office, Egypt had no ambassador in Tel Aviv. Mubarak never made an official state visit to Israel, and he frequently refused Israeli prime ministers’ requests to come to Cairo.
When the U.S. sought to extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1994, Mubarak mobilized the Arab world against the initiative, because Israel refused to sign the NPT.
Instead, Mubarak’s relationship with the Saudis usually determined his foreign policy. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and threatened to attack Saudi Arabia, Mubarak quickly dispatched troops to defend the kingdom. He was keen to support the Saudis and their Persian Gulf allies, who provided him with a steady flow of aid and an outlet for surplus Egyptian labor.
Though Mubarak’s opposition to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 happened to align with U.S. policy, he was unwilling to back other American campaigns against Arab leaders.
When President Ronald Reagan’s deputy national security adviser, John Poindexter, asked Mubarak to launch a joint U.S.-Egyptian attack against Libya in 1985, the Egyptian president scolded his visitor, saying, “Look, Admiral, when we decide to attack Libya, it will be our decision and on our timetable.”
Mubarak again refused to acquiesce in U.S. plans to isolate Libya in the 1990’s for its involvement in the downing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Instead of ostracizing Libyan leader Col. Moammar Gadhafi, Mubarak welcomed him to Cairo.
After the United Nations imposed an international flight ban against Libya in 1992, its land crossings with Egypt proved crucial to Libya’s economy (and possibly Gadhafi's political survival). Libya withstood the sanctions in part by importing food and oil infrastructure supplies via Egypt, and by exporting petroleum and steel with Mubarak’s help.
In fact, Mubarak’s Libya policy was driven largely by economic and security concerns, and rarely took U.S. interests into consideration. More than one million Egyptians worked in Libya, which was also a large export market. And Gadhafi was eager to help Mubarak subdue Islamist threats to the Egyptian regime. Unlike neighboring Sudan, which harbored Egyptian radicals, like Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who were bent on destabilizing the country, Libya turned them over to Mubarak.
While Gadhafi delivered terrorists to Mubarak, the Egyptian president declined American requests to do the same. After Palestinians in 1985 hijacked the Italian ship Achille Lauro, killed an American, and berthed in Egypt, the U.S. asked Mubarak to extradite them. But Mubarak refused, saying that Secretary of State George Shultz was “crazy” if he believed that Egypt would betray the Palestinian cause.
Egypt’s new leaders have inherited Mubarak’s dilemma – how to realize the country’s aspiration to lead the Arab world without angering its Saudi benefactors.
For this reason, the Egyptian-Iranian rapprochement will yield more photo opportunities than tangible results.
On opposite sides of religious and ethnic divides, a close bilateral relationship would seem unlikely under even the best circumstances. And, with Egypt in need of massive financial aid to offset the economic losses caused by its February revolution, its leaders can ill afford to alienate the Saudis, who view Iran, not Israel, as the gravest threat to regional stability.
Egypt is entering a new era. But the radical policy upheavals predicted by analysts will prove to be small tremors. Saudi interests will continue to weigh heavily on Egyptian foreign policy. And that, above all, means preserving the status quo.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of Barak Barfi. Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2011. For more from Barak Barfi, visit Project Syndicate.