FMCT Rejection

WITH the first plenary of the 2011 session of the Conference on Disarmament due to be held in January in Geneva, the National Command Authority in Pakistan — the body tasked with shaping the country’s nuclear policy — has declared that Pakistan will not support a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty unless existing stocks of fissile material are also made part of a treaty. The position taken by the NCA is not surprising. Pakistan’s nuclear programme is explicitly linked to that of India and the argument here is that an FMCT which does not take into account existing stocks of fissile material would put Pakistan at a permanent disadvantage because of India’s greater existing stockpiles.
While the facts are often shrouded in mystery, here’s what is argued by experts and policymakers in Pakistan. India’s civilian nuclear deal with the US, its growing conventional military superiority over Pakistan, its long-term plans for a ballistic missile defence system and its interest in dangerous war strategies such as Cold Start are all believed to put pressure on Pakistan’s declared goal of maintaining a credible minimum nuclear deterrent. The more offensive and defensive capabilities the Indian war machine acquires, the more Pakistan would need to ensure its own nuclear deterrent is viable. An FMCT negotiated without taking into account existing stockpiles would mean Pakistan would be at a permanent disadvantage in the nuclear equation with India because of India’s alleged greater fissile material stockpiles.
Yet, experts outside government circles suggest the real motivation may be that Pakistan has fissile production facilities which are expected to come online soon, meaning that a treaty any time soon would render those investments useless. Meanwhile, the WikiLeaks cables suggest that key army personnel may also have opposing views on the FMCT: DGMO Gen Javed Iqbal was allegedly in favour of the treaty, arguing that the Indo-US nuclear deal would allow India to pull away in the long term; SPD chief Gen Khalid Kidwai (retd) was opposed to the treaty. Perhaps key though is another suggestion buried in the WikiLeaks cables: if the US were more willing to address Pakistan’s strategic concerns, the possibility of a deal on the FMCT would increase.