Tanvir Ahmad Khan
The Arab world has been convulsed by people power that has as its vanguard a younger generation taking on regimes entrenched for three decades or more. In quick succession, Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain and Libya have faced a transformational upsurge with Jordan, Algeria and Yemen registering seismic shocks that are being contained with instant reform packages.
The people of Pakistan watch this panoramic change with an emotional mélange of pain, amazement and, perhaps, envy. The conventional wisdom is that this revolutionary wave will peter out short of Pakistan’s shore. This view is widely held despite the fact that many of the explosive ingredients that have rocked the Arab states are more abundantly present in Pakistan’s body politic. Judged by the traditional drivers of revolutions such as poverty, disease and other manifestations of social marginalisation of vast segments of society, Pakistan should be a more likely candidate for a mass upsurge for change than many of the Arab states.
Since 1990s, alike under political governments and General Musharraf’s dictatorship, resource-constrained Pakistan has been more exposed than most of the Arab states in turmoil today to the darker side of globalisation; the capacity of the state to intervene and reverse impoverisation of millions has visibly shrunk. It is unable to maintain law and order or, for that matter, deliver any kind of security. At the emotive level, the people share the ubiquitous Muslim outrage at injustice – an ingrained Islamic cultural attribute – and there is an extraordinary apprehension of betrayal by the political class. As amongst the Arabs, Pakistanis have a deep sense of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers with which their own government is aligned. Yet there is a sense of complacency that Pakistan is neither Tunisia nor Egypt.
What is the wellspring of this faith that the people of Pakistan will not look for Liberation Squares in their fast disintegrating cities? What are the building blocks of the breakwater that would roll back the revolutionary wave? The most cogent factor that the dominant political class cites for this optimism is that Pakistan has functioning safety valves such as democratic institutions and considerable freedom of speech. Then there is the collective memory of the people that the final outcome – the denouement – of past mass movements was very different from the one dreamt by the huge but poorly led marches because of forceful interventions by the “deep state” and the military. The Utopia of imagination just dissolved into the grim reality of dictatorship.
Where the rulers may be wrong is that many of the dykes have become vulnerable. Political challenges emerge unpredictably. The internet, the Facebook and the SMS provide alternative means of mobilisation; the minimum they do is to accentuate the disconnect between the younger generation and the ruling elite. New modes of communication, such as 24-hour TV, are driven by market forces to align themselves with popular sentiment rather than an unconvincing official narrative of stability and progress.
Above all, having denuded “reconciliation” of substance, the political class is returning to confrontation. This will impinge negatively on every factor from economic recovery to armed insurgencies.
The present scenario is, admittedly, not conducive to a quick liberating revolution; in fact, it portends something worse: descent into anarchy, drift and inane violence spreading from mega cities like Karachi to small towns and even rural areas. Revolutions can have a creative dynamic; anarchy only breeds nihilism. Pakistan has not reached the proverbial tipping point as yet. It needs to radically rethink domestic and foreign policies and not retreat into facile optimism if it wants to protect democracy.
The writer is a former foreign secretary. Email: tanvir.a.khan@ gmail.c
Wednesday, March 2, 2011
False choices and realistic options
Najam Sethi
Wednesday, March 02, 2011The word “inqilab” or “revolution” is on everybody’s lips. A majority of Pakistani “have-nots” is hoping for it while a minority of the “haves” is fearful of it. One caller to my live TV show asked: “what is the use of making all these atom bombs if they can’t be thrown on anyone,” to which another angrily provided an answer: “throw them on the poor people of Pakistan so that poverty can be eradicated in one fell blow!”
Last month, Mr Altaf Hussain added his two bits worth by exhorting “patriotic generals” to launch a “bloody revolution”. Now Mr Nawaz Sharif has decided to usurp popular sentiment and is thundering “Damadam Mast Qalandar” in his public gatherings.
So, is a “revolution” about to engulf Pakistan as in the Middle East? No, it isn’t. The collapsing autocratic kleptocracies in the Middle East are being rocked by populist forces for democracy and freedom, much like absolutist Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and Communist Eastern Europe in the late 1980s at the fag end of the Cold war. Each revolutionary wave was secular and each changed the global balance of power in the world.
But no such secular revolutionary movement for “liberty, equality and fraternity” is churning in the bowels of Pakistan. Indeed, Pakistan’s history is littered with relatively successful but non-secular popular movements for democracy and liberation from dictatorships, even if none quite managed to live up to the promise.
The first student-led revolt in 1968 ousted the secular military government of Gen Ayub Khan. The second multi-party led agitation in 1977 chucked out the secular autocratic regime of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The third popular revolt was only three years. Young lawyers backed by a free media swept the moderate government of General Pervez Musharraf from power.
That’s why despite three decades of military rule and one decade of fascism under a civilian government, and unlike the states of the Middle East where non-Islamist (but not necessarily secular) democratic change is in the air, Pakistan has an established multi-party political system, regular and broadly acceptable general elections, a fairly consensual constitution, noisy federal and provincial parliaments, fiercely free media and an independent judiciary. So we have none of the political suffocation and repression that has characterised much of the Middle East.
Does this mean that Pakistan is immune to the winds of change blowing in the rest of the Muslim world? No, it doesn’t mean that at all. There are some striking similarities with the Middle East. Over 60 percent of the population of Pakistan, like most Middle Eastern countries, is under 30 years. Most of it is unemployed, alienated and angry because the democratic system is not delivering. Like the ME, anti-Americanism is rife. And like the Middle East, there is outrage against the double standards of the west in supporting decadent, exploitative and oppressive ruling elites in the Third World while simultaneously exporting ideas of democracy, freedom, human rights and liberalism. This suggests that the idea of “revolution, people’s power and radical change” is in the air even in Pakistan.
But the growing tragedy is that this sentiment is anti-democracy, anti-secularism, anti-liberalism and anti-pluralism because the system of political democracy a la Westminster has only served to sustain a game of musical chairs for corrupt politicians and grasping soldiers who have been living off economic rents and military handouts by the United States in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives in South and West Asia. Pakistani democracy is characterised by three Ds – dynastic, dysfunctional and discredited. So is Pakistan headed for an “Islamic revolution” like Iran under Ayatollah Khomeni in 1979? No, it isn’t.
Iran lent itself to an Islamic revolution because it was uniquely different from other Muslim countries. It is ethnically united and religiously homogenous. Also, it had a class of religious scholars who were all united behind one leader. But Pakistan is not ripe for such an Islamist state. It is ethnically divided and intensely sectarian, with dozens of groups or parties constantly squabbling over religious and political issues. Strong regional sub-nationalisms and ethnic loyalties also cut into religious unity, as demonstrated by the secession of East Pakistan in 1981. In 2002, all the major religious parties formed an umbrella organisation (MMA) to contest the elections but still did not make any dent in the political system. In fact, the MMA lost badly in the 2008 elections and the religious parties are squabbling again.
Under the circumstances, what sort of change is possible in Pakistan? The obvious expectation is regime change via elections later this year. But if that merely serves to replace one dysfunctional coalition government with another, there will be more popular frustration with “democracy” and we will have merely postponed the day of reckoning.
Another option is for the military, judiciary and media to implicitly join hands against discredited politicians and political parties by propping up a civilian regime of technocrats to set things right. But keeping the PMLN and PPP out in the cold for any length of time and disqualifying their leaders won’t work. Sooner than later, the media will switch sides and start criticizing the new regime and hankering for “accountable democracy” again.
Meanwhile The various flash points in Pakistan will continue to undermine the economy and disrupt foreign polity. Unemployment, inflation and shortages will keep tempers on the boil. Increasing religiosity and anti-Americanism will keep foreign investors at bay. The mad scramble to stockpile nuclear weapons will continue to ring alarm bells in and outside the region. The proliferation of armed and organised jihadi and Taliban groups will pose severe problems for installing liberal democracy, building peace with India and doing business with the west, all of which are necessary for rejuvenating the state and society of Pakistan.
If a war with India is provoked or there is conflict with the US, then all bets will be off. Elements of a failing state are anarchy, civil strife, war, economic meltdown and secession. The only realistic option is for our political leaders to keep religious passion out of law and politics, anti-American outrage out of economic and foreign policy, and unaccountable corruption and inefficiency out of government. We must make democracy work so that Pakistan can survive and prosper as a nation-state.
The writer is Jang Group/Geo adviser on political affairs.
Wednesday, March 02, 2011The word “inqilab” or “revolution” is on everybody’s lips. A majority of Pakistani “have-nots” is hoping for it while a minority of the “haves” is fearful of it. One caller to my live TV show asked: “what is the use of making all these atom bombs if they can’t be thrown on anyone,” to which another angrily provided an answer: “throw them on the poor people of Pakistan so that poverty can be eradicated in one fell blow!”
Last month, Mr Altaf Hussain added his two bits worth by exhorting “patriotic generals” to launch a “bloody revolution”. Now Mr Nawaz Sharif has decided to usurp popular sentiment and is thundering “Damadam Mast Qalandar” in his public gatherings.
So, is a “revolution” about to engulf Pakistan as in the Middle East? No, it isn’t. The collapsing autocratic kleptocracies in the Middle East are being rocked by populist forces for democracy and freedom, much like absolutist Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and Communist Eastern Europe in the late 1980s at the fag end of the Cold war. Each revolutionary wave was secular and each changed the global balance of power in the world.
But no such secular revolutionary movement for “liberty, equality and fraternity” is churning in the bowels of Pakistan. Indeed, Pakistan’s history is littered with relatively successful but non-secular popular movements for democracy and liberation from dictatorships, even if none quite managed to live up to the promise.
The first student-led revolt in 1968 ousted the secular military government of Gen Ayub Khan. The second multi-party led agitation in 1977 chucked out the secular autocratic regime of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The third popular revolt was only three years. Young lawyers backed by a free media swept the moderate government of General Pervez Musharraf from power.
That’s why despite three decades of military rule and one decade of fascism under a civilian government, and unlike the states of the Middle East where non-Islamist (but not necessarily secular) democratic change is in the air, Pakistan has an established multi-party political system, regular and broadly acceptable general elections, a fairly consensual constitution, noisy federal and provincial parliaments, fiercely free media and an independent judiciary. So we have none of the political suffocation and repression that has characterised much of the Middle East.
Does this mean that Pakistan is immune to the winds of change blowing in the rest of the Muslim world? No, it doesn’t mean that at all. There are some striking similarities with the Middle East. Over 60 percent of the population of Pakistan, like most Middle Eastern countries, is under 30 years. Most of it is unemployed, alienated and angry because the democratic system is not delivering. Like the ME, anti-Americanism is rife. And like the Middle East, there is outrage against the double standards of the west in supporting decadent, exploitative and oppressive ruling elites in the Third World while simultaneously exporting ideas of democracy, freedom, human rights and liberalism. This suggests that the idea of “revolution, people’s power and radical change” is in the air even in Pakistan.
But the growing tragedy is that this sentiment is anti-democracy, anti-secularism, anti-liberalism and anti-pluralism because the system of political democracy a la Westminster has only served to sustain a game of musical chairs for corrupt politicians and grasping soldiers who have been living off economic rents and military handouts by the United States in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives in South and West Asia. Pakistani democracy is characterised by three Ds – dynastic, dysfunctional and discredited. So is Pakistan headed for an “Islamic revolution” like Iran under Ayatollah Khomeni in 1979? No, it isn’t.
Iran lent itself to an Islamic revolution because it was uniquely different from other Muslim countries. It is ethnically united and religiously homogenous. Also, it had a class of religious scholars who were all united behind one leader. But Pakistan is not ripe for such an Islamist state. It is ethnically divided and intensely sectarian, with dozens of groups or parties constantly squabbling over religious and political issues. Strong regional sub-nationalisms and ethnic loyalties also cut into religious unity, as demonstrated by the secession of East Pakistan in 1981. In 2002, all the major religious parties formed an umbrella organisation (MMA) to contest the elections but still did not make any dent in the political system. In fact, the MMA lost badly in the 2008 elections and the religious parties are squabbling again.
Under the circumstances, what sort of change is possible in Pakistan? The obvious expectation is regime change via elections later this year. But if that merely serves to replace one dysfunctional coalition government with another, there will be more popular frustration with “democracy” and we will have merely postponed the day of reckoning.
Another option is for the military, judiciary and media to implicitly join hands against discredited politicians and political parties by propping up a civilian regime of technocrats to set things right. But keeping the PMLN and PPP out in the cold for any length of time and disqualifying their leaders won’t work. Sooner than later, the media will switch sides and start criticizing the new regime and hankering for “accountable democracy” again.
Meanwhile The various flash points in Pakistan will continue to undermine the economy and disrupt foreign polity. Unemployment, inflation and shortages will keep tempers on the boil. Increasing religiosity and anti-Americanism will keep foreign investors at bay. The mad scramble to stockpile nuclear weapons will continue to ring alarm bells in and outside the region. The proliferation of armed and organised jihadi and Taliban groups will pose severe problems for installing liberal democracy, building peace with India and doing business with the west, all of which are necessary for rejuvenating the state and society of Pakistan.
If a war with India is provoked or there is conflict with the US, then all bets will be off. Elements of a failing state are anarchy, civil strife, war, economic meltdown and secession. The only realistic option is for our political leaders to keep religious passion out of law and politics, anti-American outrage out of economic and foreign policy, and unaccountable corruption and inefficiency out of government. We must make democracy work so that Pakistan can survive and prosper as a nation-state.
The writer is Jang Group/Geo adviser on political affairs.
Tuesday, March 1, 2011
Foreign policy: a headless wonder
The geographic contiguity to Afghanistan makes Pakistan a vital element in the West’s most expensive war fought out of the European theatre. The US defines Pakistan as its core policy concern, even if at present Washington is struggling to keep its ties on an even keel in the aftermath of the Raymond Davis case. China sees Pakistan as a fundamental ally. India calls it a perpetual thorn in its side. Kashmiris see it — yes, they still do — as their only friend.
Then being the second-largest Muslim state, Pakistan’s internal developments cause ripples in the over one billion Muslim population across the globe. And yet, incredibly, for a third week running this very important country is without a foreign minister.
In the heap of other more immediate, headline-grabbing issues this might appear as a small omission. In reality, the absence of a foreign minister and the lack of any anxiety on the part of the government to fill the gap make a more important point, showing the upside down priorities of the PPP. This also shows that others like the PML-N are no better.
There are reasons for the relegation of foreign policy concerns to the lowest level of attention. The more obvious one is an all-consuming and increasingly self-defeating political wrangle that the entire political class has entangled itself in.
Practically every second of every day is being spent on winning the tug of political war. The PPP is preparing for the endgame with regard to its present stint in power. It has positioned all its cards for the mid-term elections. It is digging its heels in Sindh’s heartland.
The imagined assault from the army on its political base is making the PPP leadership issue clarion calls to its workers. While Punjab’s stalemated political arena is the main story, the real worry preoccupying everyone in the PPP is the possibility of a ‘constitutional coup’. Foreign policy is the last thing on their minds. Not having a foreign minister is the least of their concerns.
The cabinet head, the prime minister, has an additional set of problems. His family’s alleged corruption scandals have begun to compete in publicity with those of the more notorious of his comrades. His son has put up a valiant but late-in-the-day defence of his newly displayed assets, including a bulletproof vehicle. (The ease with which Gilani-2 rattles off the fake history of his ancestral wealth and privileged background is breath-stopping.) However, the prime minister’s name is still at the centre of the blighting accusations of financial misconduct.
In these unremitting circumstances, he, like his party, needs wily speakers with jaws of steel to lay counter punches into opponents. His first agenda is to have Dr Firdous Ashiq Awan around. Finding a suitable replacement for Shah Mehmood Qureshi can come later.
Normally, an agile opposition would have made a fuss over the critical cabinet posts being kept vacant and would have reminded the prime minister of his glaring neglect. However, the present-day opposition is just as engrossed in playing farcical politics as the government it hopes to undo.
The entire thrust of the PML-N’s activity is centred on cornering the government politically and scoring debating points. Nothing else is materially important to it.
Except in the context of Raymond Davis, even pro forma statements on foreign policy concerns have been missing from the opposition corner. No one has expanded on the symbolic as well as actual implications of a cabinet without a foreign minister. This is one subject that does not interest the opposition leadership. This is a low priority area.
The other reason for which politics has taken over foreign policy relates to civil-military relations that are in a state of disrepair. PPP leaders first complain that the army-led establishment has created an exclusive domain in foreign and defence policy, but then heave a sigh of relief in the same breath.
This arrangement saves them the trouble of taking controversial positions, helps them avoid locking horns with important foreign countries where their financial interests are being looked after rather well, and as a bonus frees up time to visit their constituencies to indulge in the politics of crumbs and cronies.
The truism that every elected politician knows by heart is that incumbent foreign ministers seldom win elections. But the general explanation they offer for casually treating foreign policy runs something like this: ‘What difference does it make if a federal cabinet has a foreign minister? He, at best would be a formal façade to a reality that everyone knows — with or without a foreign minister, the brass runs foreign affairs.’
Whether the generals sideline civilians or civilians abdicate their responsibilities and become marginalised is a circular argument that can last forever. (Though one can legitimately ask why have the defence minister when the generals’ power is the maximum in this realm.)
However, for an elected government in charge of arguably one of the world’s most important countries to keep the foreign minister’s post vacant is indefensible. While Hina Rabbani Khar (known mainly for copious note-taking in meetings from her previous assignment as minister of state for finance) is an improvement on her predecessor, she cannot step up to the task of representing Pakistan in a complex world.
Pakistan needs a full-time foreign minister. This vacancy reinforces the impression that this government simply does not understand how crucial these times are for the country.
The writer is a senior journalist at DawnNews.
Ideological radicalisation
By M. Zaidi | From the NewspaperIT is necessary to clarify the associations of ideology with radicalisation at the outset, since the debate about ideology being the major construct of radicalisation rages on. Simplifying complex issues into binary opposites which create a visceral impact is a characteristic of ideologies, especially when they tend to articulate a set of grievances of one set of people against another.
This sort of simplification is also the predominant process within radicalisation. This is the contextual paradigm of ideology that resonates within paradigms of terrorism in Pakistan, wherein the terrorists have used a reductionist worldview to whittle down complex socio-economic, geo-strategic and political problems, into essentially a contest between good and evil.
Thus, there are hardly any grey areas for terrorists in Pakistan i.e. the fellow citizen not following the terrorist ideology is clearly a murtid, one who has turned away from the true faith as perceived by one school of thought or sect against the other.
Since ideologies present the perfect spatial parameter for the conflict to be resolved by the logical triumph of the perceived good over perceived evil, it is important to comprehend that ideology can be used and has been used as a potent tool fostering terrorism in Pakistan. Thus, terrorist attacks become justifiable through the ideology of the perpetrators.
The need for action which edifies the spirit and allows the ideology to grow has been a common theme within anarchism, fascism, communism, and for the purpose of this essay, radicalisation.
When there is a conducive environment which induces a sense of emasculation or despair, ideology can provide not only a source of solace, but an impetus for action for populations undergoing stresses. Thus, venting grievances through the platform of ideology whether it is jihadism or any other, has the potential of making the message resonate, going out to other persons undergoing similar stimuli.
Since an ideology is self-replicating, it will have the potential of attracting more converts. In essence, it is actually more powerful than the violent behaviour which it inculcates. In the Pakistani context, this means that extremist terrorist ideologies are an over-arching paradigm which drive and foster terrorism, and in many cases, radicalisation.
It also needs to be realised that a single variable is not always enough to radicalise individuals.
For example, religion as an ideology or set of ideologies is often unthinkingly invoked as the paramount disposing factor radicalising Pakistan, without taking into account the fact that issues of terrorism and extremism do not arise merely out of ideology. Rather, the problems that Pakistan is confronted with also arise from fundamental socio-economic and class inequalities, which have prompted a reaction amongst the have-nots to challenge the disproportionately affluent elite.
This has espoused, promoted and encouraged orthodox, rigid and fundamentalist versions of religion, as opposed to more tolerant, peaceful ones. As Pakistan redefined its identity by invoking the Arabic origin of Islam during the Afghan jihad days, the relatively more tolerant, syncretic and peaceful versions of the religion in South Asia have been replaced by harsh, literalist and bland versions of orthodox Islam amongst an extremist fringe.
This ideological trajectory allows young Pakistanis to go towards radicalisation, and adds support for militant agendas from among the Pakistani populace, particularly when there is high unemployment and income disparity. This income disparity has manifested itself in the ratio of the highest to lowest income quintiles ranging from 3.76 in 2001 to 4.15 in 2005, and further to 4.2 in 2005-06.
Since poorer households in Pakistan tend to have a higher number of children on average, especially in rural areas, it implies that an exceptionally large number of young men and women are being forced to live below or around the poverty line.
Furthermore, at least one-tenth of the rural community does not have access to even basic facilities, which adds stress to an already overburdened economy. The families are ultra poor. Their children seem destined for a grim future, particularly with regard to employment. The high level of under-employment for the young from the lower socio-economic classes causes an additional strain. The growing economy has increased the labour market and the unemployment rate has declined to around 5.32 per cent in recent years. This modest improvement cannot cope with the rapidly-expanding youth population.
This alienates the poor segment of the youth, since the majority of non-elite young men can only find menial, unfulfilling jobs. Since the richest 20 per cent of the population continue to grow richer, the sense of alienation among the poor young men is not surprising, and forces them to look for alternatives.
Radicalisation is one of the ways through which the poor and the dispossessed find a voice, since the path to radicalisation demands action to challenge the status quo, often in the form of violent activism. This violent action may become terrorism in its extreme manifestations, or smoulder within the non-elite youth in the form of extremism.
Thus, assuming radicalisation to be a process, and also assuming certain Pakistani demographic segments to be more vulnerable to it than others, one can draw up frameworks of how individuals in Pakistan tend to get radicalised, and then occupy these frameworks. Studying these trends is the need of the day, and is becoming more urgent with every passing moment.
The writer is a security analyst.
This sort of simplification is also the predominant process within radicalisation. This is the contextual paradigm of ideology that resonates within paradigms of terrorism in Pakistan, wherein the terrorists have used a reductionist worldview to whittle down complex socio-economic, geo-strategic and political problems, into essentially a contest between good and evil.
Thus, there are hardly any grey areas for terrorists in Pakistan i.e. the fellow citizen not following the terrorist ideology is clearly a murtid, one who has turned away from the true faith as perceived by one school of thought or sect against the other.
Since ideologies present the perfect spatial parameter for the conflict to be resolved by the logical triumph of the perceived good over perceived evil, it is important to comprehend that ideology can be used and has been used as a potent tool fostering terrorism in Pakistan. Thus, terrorist attacks become justifiable through the ideology of the perpetrators.
The need for action which edifies the spirit and allows the ideology to grow has been a common theme within anarchism, fascism, communism, and for the purpose of this essay, radicalisation.
When there is a conducive environment which induces a sense of emasculation or despair, ideology can provide not only a source of solace, but an impetus for action for populations undergoing stresses. Thus, venting grievances through the platform of ideology whether it is jihadism or any other, has the potential of making the message resonate, going out to other persons undergoing similar stimuli.
Since an ideology is self-replicating, it will have the potential of attracting more converts. In essence, it is actually more powerful than the violent behaviour which it inculcates. In the Pakistani context, this means that extremist terrorist ideologies are an over-arching paradigm which drive and foster terrorism, and in many cases, radicalisation.
It also needs to be realised that a single variable is not always enough to radicalise individuals.
For example, religion as an ideology or set of ideologies is often unthinkingly invoked as the paramount disposing factor radicalising Pakistan, without taking into account the fact that issues of terrorism and extremism do not arise merely out of ideology. Rather, the problems that Pakistan is confronted with also arise from fundamental socio-economic and class inequalities, which have prompted a reaction amongst the have-nots to challenge the disproportionately affluent elite.
This has espoused, promoted and encouraged orthodox, rigid and fundamentalist versions of religion, as opposed to more tolerant, peaceful ones. As Pakistan redefined its identity by invoking the Arabic origin of Islam during the Afghan jihad days, the relatively more tolerant, syncretic and peaceful versions of the religion in South Asia have been replaced by harsh, literalist and bland versions of orthodox Islam amongst an extremist fringe.
This ideological trajectory allows young Pakistanis to go towards radicalisation, and adds support for militant agendas from among the Pakistani populace, particularly when there is high unemployment and income disparity. This income disparity has manifested itself in the ratio of the highest to lowest income quintiles ranging from 3.76 in 2001 to 4.15 in 2005, and further to 4.2 in 2005-06.
Since poorer households in Pakistan tend to have a higher number of children on average, especially in rural areas, it implies that an exceptionally large number of young men and women are being forced to live below or around the poverty line.
Furthermore, at least one-tenth of the rural community does not have access to even basic facilities, which adds stress to an already overburdened economy. The families are ultra poor. Their children seem destined for a grim future, particularly with regard to employment. The high level of under-employment for the young from the lower socio-economic classes causes an additional strain. The growing economy has increased the labour market and the unemployment rate has declined to around 5.32 per cent in recent years. This modest improvement cannot cope with the rapidly-expanding youth population.
This alienates the poor segment of the youth, since the majority of non-elite young men can only find menial, unfulfilling jobs. Since the richest 20 per cent of the population continue to grow richer, the sense of alienation among the poor young men is not surprising, and forces them to look for alternatives.
Radicalisation is one of the ways through which the poor and the dispossessed find a voice, since the path to radicalisation demands action to challenge the status quo, often in the form of violent activism. This violent action may become terrorism in its extreme manifestations, or smoulder within the non-elite youth in the form of extremism.
Thus, assuming radicalisation to be a process, and also assuming certain Pakistani demographic segments to be more vulnerable to it than others, one can draw up frameworks of how individuals in Pakistan tend to get radicalised, and then occupy these frameworks. Studying these trends is the need of the day, and is becoming more urgent with every passing moment.
The writer is a security analyst.
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