The Undead Chicken

April 26, 2011 · By John Feffer

With Libya, the Obama administration has followed the Chinese adage: kill the chicken to scare the monkeys. But the chicken still rules the roost in Tripoli.

Muammar Gaddafi is the undead chicken. Bashar al-Assad of Syria and King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa of Bahrain are the unscared monkeys.
The United States has shaped its policy toward the evolving situation in the Middle East according to the Chinese proverb of “killing the chicken to scare the monkey.” The Obama administration has intervened in the conflict in Libya with the apparent goal of punishing Gaddafi for cracking down on the emerging protest movement back in February. This intervention was designed to send a message to other autocrats in the region: don’t fire on your unarmed opposition — or else.
But the United States and its allies are having problems with the "or else" part of the equation. Despite going beyond a no-fly zone, they have only struck a glancing blow against Gaddafi. The chicken is bleeding, but it hasn’t yet flown the coop. Rebel forces have regained their edge in the key city of Misurata, but Gaddafi’s air strikes have also knocked out oil production in the rebel-held zone for a month. There are voices inside NATO calling for more: more U.S. involvement, a surge in air strikes, even boots on the ground. The talk of where to send Gaddafi into exile has shifted to how to handle him if he survives the onslaught.
The Obama administration continues to insist that the mission is all about protecting civilians, not instigating regime change. But that position has become ever more difficult to maintain, especially with the recent introduction of unmanned drones and their dubious record of killing large numbers of civilians in Pakistan. In Vietnam, we destroyed villages to save them; in Libya, are we killing civilians to save them? Or is U.S. policy, as in Kosovo, more about protecting U.S. soldiers by dispensing death from a distance? Humanitarian intervention is not a dinner party, as Mao Zedong might have said under the circumstances. It’s not for the squeamish. And monkeys are not scared by chickens that have only been roughed up.
In Syria and Bahrain, the authorities may well be under siege, but the unfolding of the Libya scenario has not prompted them to step down, institute major reforms, or otherwise demonstrate their fear of outside pressure.
In Bahrain, for instance, Washington has given the ruling al-Khalifa family little more than a slap on the wrist. Since the protests began in February, the government has cracked down hard. Government forces killed more than 20 protestors; several have died under suspicious circumstances in custody; more than 30 medical personnel have simply disappeared. “U.S. pressure was crucial in advancing democratic revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, but Washington has been far from helpful for Gulf protesters,” writes Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF) contributor Richard Javad Heydarian in The Economics of the Arab Spring. “This has reinforced many protesters’ views of the United States as a staunch supporter of oppressive regimes rather than a democracy promoter.”
In addition to hosting the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet — and thereby holding it hostage — Bahrain has spooked Washington by identifying the hand of Iran behind the opposition’s activities. “With reference to Iran’s alleged covert intelligence activities in Bahrain, the leader of the National Unity Gathering party, Shaykh Abd-al-Latif al-Mahmud went so far as to claim that the Iranian charge d’affaires himself was distributing weapons to Shi’a protesters in Manama,” writes FPIF contributor Bernd Kaussler in Gulf of Mistrust.
In Syria, Assad knows that the Obama administration is not going to take on yet another military intervention, particularly in a country that could easily disintegrate into a nasty civil war. Even Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), the Hill's greatest champion of military intervention in Libya, is not calling for something similar in Syria. The Syrian government has already killed several hundred protestors and sealed off the city of Dara’a, where major protests began. As a result, the Obama administration is considering targeted sanctions. But even pulling the ambassador from Damascus is not yet on the table. If the demonstrators eventually dislodge Assad or his family or the Alawite minority that rules the country, it will not likely be because of a no-fly zone or similar military action. The most that the United States has done is fund an anti-government TV station. After all, Washington is not even sure that it wants Assad gone, since the alternatives might be less palatable.
Those who hope that the Arab Spring will turn into an Arab Summer can take some heart from the turn of events in Yemen. Readers of Dexter Filkins’ in-depth piece on Yemen in The New Yorker might come away with the impression that President Ali Abdullah Saleh could retain power forever through a mixture of brutality, pay-offs, and careful manipulation of a variety of après-moi-le-deluge threats including an emboldened al-Qaeda and a Somali-like failed state. And yet, even as Assad was sending in the tanks in Dara’a and Gaddafi was battling the rebels in Misurata, Saleh offered to meet a key opposition demand by stepping down. The catch is that he wants immunity from prosecution. The opposition, however, wants to see Saleh on trial, and who can blame them? Poles had to stomach a transition period with the much-reviled Wojciech Jaruzelski as president in 1989. In contrast, Egyptians have had the distinct pleasure of seeing Mubarak and sons go to prison. The Yemenis were aiming for an Egyptian solution but it now appears that they are settling for a Polish one.
Saleh’s sudden vulnerability stems largely from the courageous efforts of the opposition movement. He certainly didn't learn the lesson of Libya, which was that a tyrant can oppress his people, stand up to the international community, and live to rule another day. Like his fellow authoritarians in Syria and Bahrain, Muammar Gaddafi is not yet taking the golden parachute option. By maintaining his status as an undead chicken, he aims to make a monkey out of the Obama administration.

From Asia to Latin America

Shortly before the earthquake and tsunami hit Japan, a crisis hit the Japan section at the State Department. Kevin Maher, head of the Japan desk, was quoted in the Japanese press saying some very unflattering things about Okinawa and Okinawans. Maher resigned but has recently claimed that the quotes were fabricated. FPIF contributor David Vine was present at the meeting with American University students where Maher made his comments, and he corroborates the reports that Maher called Okinawans “lazy” and “extortionists.”
“Among the many ironies in Maher’s words was his characterization of Okinawans as extortionists when U.S. negotiators like Maher have long pressed the Japanese government for larger and larger contributions to support the U.S. military presence in East Asia,” Vine writes in Smearing Japan.
While the United States tries to mend fences with Japan, China is increasing its influence in Latin America. Chinese trade with the region has skyrocketed, and it has extended considerable aid as well. But China too has met with some of the same accusations of arrogance that the United States has in Asia. “Despite the strides that China has made in the region, countries remain apprehensive,” writes FPIF contributor Sebastian Castaneda in Chinese Take-Over of South America? “The WikiLeaks diplomatic cables highlighted the level of suspicion. One Colombian trade representative based in Beijing noted that his country would not be ‘walked all over’ by China ‘like Africa.’ A Mexican official stated that ‘we don’t want to be China’s next Africa.’”
Mexico, meanwhile, is being rocked by wave after wave of drug-related murders. The Mexican government has long accused the United States of lax gun laws that encourage the flow of weapons south. Now it turns out that the U.S. government itself has been secretly sending guns to drug cartels in Mexico.
“The operation, called ‘Fast and Furious,’ was run out of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) office in Phoenix, Arizona,” explains FPIF columnist Laura Carlsen in Obama’s Mexicogate? “ATF sanctioned the purchase of weapons in U.S. gun shops and tracked the smuggling route to the Mexican border. Reportedly, more than 2,500 firearms were sold to straw buyers who then handed off the weapons to gunrunners under the nose of ATF.”
Finally, in our FPIF Picks this week, FPIF contributor Greg Chaffin looks at The Sixth Crisis by Dana Allin and Steven Simon. The book, writes Chaffin in his review, “successfully provides an historical understanding of how the tensions between Israel and the Arab world have shaped the geopolitical realities of the region and influenced a looming crisis over Iranian nuclearization that will have worldwide repercussions.”

Fear of devolution

By Afiya S. Zia

IT is ironic how the very vocal supporters of a seriously flawed devolution programme under Gen Musharraf, are opposing a more comprehensive devolution initiated by the current government.

These critics accuse the present civilian rule of being a spurious democracy, presumably in comparison to the `true` democratic military rule of Musharraf. Many such allegations have not relied on legal or constitutional definitions of democracy, not even sociological arguments; but almost always on encryptions, such as the personalities of leaders, their academic (fake) qualifications or their naked profiteering from office. These may be important in assessing the quality of government but not necessarily in measuring its democratic worth. Instead, in the cacophony of political opinions, it may be fair to say that there have been two streams of more serious critical arguments concerning the flaws and shortcomings in the democratic credentials of the current government.
The first and most crucial misgiving over the democratic merit of this government has been with regard to its clash with the judiciary and the subsequent inability to resolve the institutional balance of powers. However, several commentators have held that the judiciary itself requires introspection regarding its own role in this impasse.
Second, the lack of resolve to govern when it is crucially required has exposed this government`s role in weakening democracy. By choosing to relinquish its authority, be it on issues of law and order, succumbing to unelected, non-representative religious lobbies, surrendering Fata to the army and US-led operations, reneging on reassurances to Balochistan, this government has been criminally irresponsible. Such rabbit-caught-in-the-headlights responses have amounted to lost opportunities for strengthening serious democratic change afforded in the post-Musharraf period and for which Pakistan will pay a price certainly.
However, any student of democracy will verify that those mechanisms whereby power is thwarted from a centralised system and redistributed, is a necessary component of a fair and representative political system. Even the most vociferous critics of military rule were honest in their assessment of the devolution of 2000 and acknowledged that in principle this was a feature of democracy. Of course, the political motivations behind such fig-leaf moves seeking legitimacy were immediately exposed in the contradictory outcomes. Some appreciable grass-root empowerment went unsupported due to the deliberately unsustainable projects that were launched.
The passing of the 18th Amendment is one of the very few parliamentary initiatives that suggest that this neutered government can actually be effectual if it resolves to be so. All the more reason, that oppositional voices should be muted on this point. Instead, even some pro-democrats are now objecting to the dismantling of federal ministries. Strangely, several `progressives` within civil society, who in theory have been supporting devolution, provincial autonomy and all the usual slogans that liberal democrats carry, are now demonstrating ambiguity over the wisdom of relinquishing authority from some institutions that were `doing good things` in their centralised capacity.
Granted, there has always been historical concern over possible challenges to basic liberties in the name of culture or provincial parochialism. The proposed Hasba bill in what was the NWFP is an example of such apprehension but this was resolved by invoking constitutional pre-eminence. The committee of the 18th Amendment has made it clear that constitutional supremacy and protection of fundamental rights defines the spirit of the devolution of federal authority. All the constitution is meant to do, after all, is to give us cover.
The fear of provincial elite capture, nepotism and ineptness are some of the excuses forwarded by critics. In reality, such criticism stems from a collaborative fear of loss of influence. This is particularly true of those who have made careers by way of establishing networks by pursuing personal relationships with the offices of government, the bureaucracy and donor agencies in Islamabad. It`s no secret that the more savvy and privileged maintain homes and offices in the capital to locate themselves within easy access to the corridors of centralised power. Under the 18th Amendment this may just prove to be a losing investment — not in terms of real estate but by way of power-brokering and procuring projects and contracts.
International agencies would prefer not to wander outside the confines of a city where, traditionally, the mountains have been coming to them. Now, there will have to be more direct interaction with the messy, less familiar, and non-urbane provincial actors and without the interlocution of friendly consultants to advise on the pre-decided fate of projects.
An additional reason to worry is that devolution provides an opportunity for autonomous thinking, planning and development. Under devolution, the Millennium Development Goals and other international guidelines may well be realigned for more contextualised policies that are more relevant to local priorities. So for example, `education for all` may no longer be seen as some measurable tool for increased enrolment. Instead, provincial departments may prioritise their immediate needs as the protection of schools from being bombed or preventing harassment of women on campuses. Yes, we`re told it`s not either/or, yet the fact is that a lot of donor and federal funds prioritise tailor-made projects that lend measurable `outcomes` rather than being led by locally identified, non-quantifiable needs.
Anyone who has been paying attention to the people`s movements at local levels would despair at the sheer distance and lack of responsiveness between federal authorities and the voices of peasants, lady health workers or families of the disappeared.
The devolution process under the 18th Amendment is a tremendous opportunity for us to forge relationships, influence policies and immerse ourselves in our provincial environs. It`s also a responsibility that calls on us to reflect honestly on why we fear what is in principle a fair and democratic process. If we do not embrace opportunities such as this under the pretence of losing `progress so far` then we need to rethink our tools of analysis that have made us such slavish thinkers. If devolution fails this time around we only have ourselves to blame.
The writer is a researcher who writes on socio-political issues.