INTERCESSION has become one of those controversial topics for which arguments are provided from both sides of the divide. The Quran says, `O you who believe! Fear Allah and seek a wasila to him`(5:35).
In Arabic `wasila` stands for a link, a means to an end or an intermediary. `Tawassul` or `shifa`a`, means intercession, or to seek a means to an end. It means to plead with somebody on behalf of somebody else, in this world as well as on the Day of Judgment. When the word `Shaafi`is used for God, it means one who gives permission for intercession.
Many verses have been misunderstood out of context and some people think that the Quran contradicts itself and says in some places that intercession is valid and in others that it is not.
According to the Quran, those denied intercession are the ones who did not believe, or those who transgressed: `The intercession of the intercessors will be of no use to them` (74:48), referring to those in hell. The Bani Israel are told, `Fear the Day (of Judgment when) ... No fine will be acceptable and neither will any intercession be useful` (2:123).
Some verses which make it clear that without God`s permission and promise, no one can intercede, also reassure that intercession will take place: `They will have no (claim to) intercession, except for those who have the promise of the Most Merciful` (19:87; 34:23). No one can act as intercessor except by His leave (10:3; 2:255; 21:28). `On that Day no intercession will matter other than his whom Ar-Rehman grants permission and accepts` (20:109). The Makkan belief that their idolswould intercede for them is refuted (30:13).
God tells the Prophet (PBUH): `And in the night, pray the tahajjud, which is additional for you for soon your Lord will raise you to the Station of Praise (Maqam Mehmud)` (17:79).
Recited in the middle of the night, this prayer was made obligatory for the Prophet, but is voluntary for his followers. The Prophet`s `Station of Praise` will be the highest human station on the Day of Judgment.
A hadith states that on that day people will be running to and fro looking for an intercessor, until they come to the Prophet Muhammad, who will answer, `I am for intercession`. The Lord will then ask him to `...intercede, for your intercession will be heard` (Bukhari).
One of the titles of the Prophet is `shaafi`, one who performs intercession. Other spiritual leaders who will act as intermediaries will be prophets, martyrs, huffaz of the Quran, angels and pious people whom God deems fit. Prophet Jesus` intercession for his people on the Day of Judgment is mentioned in the Quran (5:16-18).
According to Tirmidhi, Ibn Majah and others: `A blind man came to the Prophet and said: `I`ve been afflicted in my eyesight, so pray to Allah for me`. The Prophet said: `Go and perform wudu (ablution), perform two rakat salat and then say: `O Allah! I ask you and turn to you through my Prophet Muhammad, the Prophet of Mercy. O Muhammad! I seek your intercession with my Lord for the return of my eyesight, that it may be fulfilled. O Allah! Grant him intercession for me`. The Prophet then said: `And if there is some other need, do the same` Tawassul can be carried out through a living as well as a dead person, as it refers to the permanent, positive status attached to that person, living or dead. Uthmaan ibn Hunayf taught this prayer to someone long after the Prophet`s death.
Praying to God for a particular need, using some honourable personality, such as the Prophet and other righteous believers, as a wasila or intermediary, without supplicating to that person, or thinking that he has the power to provide, is permitted by the four schools of the Sunni fiqh. Even Ibn Taymiyah believed that God would allow the Prophet and the spiritual leaders to intercede for believers. Since they will be alive on Judgment Day, their intercession will be effective.
If a person supplicates directly to the deceased, believing that the prophets and pious persons are independently in possession of the power to provide, then this would be shirk or polytheism, and would be equal to assigning partners to God in his attribute of Al Razzak or The Provider.
There are various types of intercessions: first, through the beautiful names (attributes) of God `Allah has beautiful names, so call unto Him through them` (7:180). Second, through the good deeds of the person. Three people were trapped in a cave. Each made a supplication to God to accept their prayers due to some good deed that each had done (Bukhari). Third, requesting the living, righteous people to pray for them, and, four, to make tawassul to God through the rank of certain individuals in the sight of Allah, alive or dead.
A distinction between the living and the dead in this matter is like believing in the perishing of the souls at the time of death. This is tantamount to denial of resurrection. The intercession on Judgment Day will be like grace marks given by God to a believer who tried but could not come up to the desired level. It will be the pleading by one to whom God gives permission, only for the one for whom God gives permission: `In God`s power is complete intercession` (39:44), and all power belongs to God. • The writer is a scholar of the Quran, and writes on contemporary issues.
nilofar.ahmed58@gmail.com
Friday, November 25, 2011
Wednesday, November 16, 2011
Imagining real democracy
By Niaz Murtaza | 11/16/2011 12:00:00 AM
AKBAR Zaidi rightly argued in this paper recently that Pakistan`s governance problems under elected governments reflect failures of particular regimes rather than democracy, since Pakistan is yet to experience genuine democracy.
What is genuine democracy? Democracy is the government of the people by the people for the people. `Of and by the people` means that state power must be attained democratically through elections. `For the people` means that power is subsequently exercised democratically. Real democracy exists only when state power is attained and exercised democratically.
The concepts of democratic transition and consolidation help in unpacking the black box of democracy further.
Democratic transition represents the first move towards democracy. i.e. a country`s first free elections with near universal suffrage, competition and acceptance. Thus, it refers to how state power is attained.
Pakistan`s democratic transition started with the `Pakistani Spring`of March 1969 which overthrew Ayub and subsequently fostered free elections with near-universal suffrage and competition. Unfortunately, the transition was imperfect as the elections results were not universally accepted and caused Pakistan`s bifurcation.
Democratic consolidation consists of democratic stability and quality.
Democratic stability occurs when democracy is accepted as the only game in town, and free elections with near-universal suffrage, competition and acceptance are held regularly. Pakistan`s post-transition history poignantly reflects its struggles with democratic stability. Half of those 40 years have been spent under military rule. The seven elections held since then have all fallen short of global standards. Democracy is still not seen as the only game in town by the military and militants. It is not clear whether this government will complete its term and whether the next government will emerge democratically.
Finally, democratic quality means that power is exercised democratically after elections. It consists of six sub-dimensions. First, the elected government`s power must not be unconstitutionally fettered, functionally or geographically.
Functionally, Pakistan`s security policy always resides with the military while donors often exercise undue influence on economic policy. Geographically, parts of Pakistan often become `no-go` for governments while many rural elites maintain their own mini-kingdoms.
Second, the flip side of power not being fettered unconstitutionally is that it should be fettered constitutionally through its distribution. Horizontally, it must be distributed across the executive, legislature, judiciary and political parties.
Vertically, it should be devolved provincially and locally. Shore of considerable power unconstitutionally, Pakistani central executives become reluctant to share further power constitutionally. While the judiciary has succeeded in wresting some constitutional power, other horizontal institutions remain powerless. The 18th Amendment represents the first salvo in achieving provincial autonomy. However, local governments, toothless even earlier, are in limbo presently.
The third requirement is the rule of law, with clear, non-discriminatory laws and an efficient justice system to apply them to public and public officials.
Pakistan still uses many anachronistic British-era laws and has added other laws which discriminate against women and minorities. While the Supreme Court has breathed fire (two-pronged) into the judicial system, lower courts do not provide efficient justice while the police are notoriously corrupt. Finally, public officials escape justice because of NAB`s dis empowerment.
Fourth, elected governments should guarantee civic liberty and equality.
Beyond discriminatory laws, large sections of Pakistan`s population, especially women and minorities, have lost these rights to non-state actors, e.g. militants and landlords. Even elected governments exhibit neither the capacity nor the willingness to redress these usurped rights.
Fifth, real democracy requires policies which enhance economic equity, i.e.
equality of opportunities for all and safety nets for the vulnerable. Beyond populist rhetoric and makeshift programmes, economic policies even under elected Pakistani governments remain elitist, with little attempt to tax the rich adequately and implement socio-economic programmes.
Sixth, real democracy requires vigorous feedback loops from the electorate to the elected in between elections. These loops include electoral mechanisms and civil society activities. Pakistani media has definitely become vigorous lately though not necessarily mature. CNN transformed news from what had hap-pened in the past to what is happening presently through on-time ground coverage. Going one step further, certain Pakistani media outlets have miraculously transformed news into what will happen in the future, through armchair analysis. Consequently, much of their news consists of predictions, e.g., about when the government will fall.
So, it seems strange to blame democracy when Pakistan has never experienced it. Clearly, high democratic quality, as defined above, could help Pakistan resolve many knotty problems, e.g. corruption and poverty. Why has Pakistan struggled to attain real democracy? Some would argue, partly validly, that the frequent interruptions of democracy have undermined its quality.
However, more crucial is the absence of certain societal characteristics, i.e.
high education, incomes, urbanisation and meritocracy. These characteristics foster democratic quality by strengthenine the feedback loops unleashed by civilsociety activities.
These factors, in turn, are facilitated by increasing economic opportunities for common people. While poor governance hampers such opportunities in Pakistan, industrious Pakistanisescape this vicious circle of stagnation by migrating abroad and subsequently sending remittances, which create further opportunities. The process will be slow but such improvised opportunities represent Pakistan`s best chance of attaining real democracy and good governance.
Any mention of the fact that Pakistan`s societal characteristics may not be immediately suitable for real democracy provides fodder to imaginative minds looking forever for alternatives. Martial law has lost charm because of its repeated failures, but a controlled form of presidential democracy where the vast majority is disqualified from not only competing but even voting seems to be the current favourite. This option seems suspiciously similar to Ayub Khan`s failed experiments.
Another favourite in some circles is the `khilafat` option. In Muslim history, righteous khilafat lasted merely a few decades. Which is more likely to emerge in today`s Pakistan? Some people never learn from history it seems. To paraphrase Thatcher`s comment about capitalism, there is no alternative to democracy. While this slogan is certainly not true about capitalism, applied to democracy, there is no escaping from this simple truth. • The writer is a political economist at the University of California, Berkeley.
AKBAR Zaidi rightly argued in this paper recently that Pakistan`s governance problems under elected governments reflect failures of particular regimes rather than democracy, since Pakistan is yet to experience genuine democracy.
What is genuine democracy? Democracy is the government of the people by the people for the people. `Of and by the people` means that state power must be attained democratically through elections. `For the people` means that power is subsequently exercised democratically. Real democracy exists only when state power is attained and exercised democratically.
The concepts of democratic transition and consolidation help in unpacking the black box of democracy further.
Democratic transition represents the first move towards democracy. i.e. a country`s first free elections with near universal suffrage, competition and acceptance. Thus, it refers to how state power is attained.
Pakistan`s democratic transition started with the `Pakistani Spring`of March 1969 which overthrew Ayub and subsequently fostered free elections with near-universal suffrage and competition. Unfortunately, the transition was imperfect as the elections results were not universally accepted and caused Pakistan`s bifurcation.
Democratic consolidation consists of democratic stability and quality.
Democratic stability occurs when democracy is accepted as the only game in town, and free elections with near-universal suffrage, competition and acceptance are held regularly. Pakistan`s post-transition history poignantly reflects its struggles with democratic stability. Half of those 40 years have been spent under military rule. The seven elections held since then have all fallen short of global standards. Democracy is still not seen as the only game in town by the military and militants. It is not clear whether this government will complete its term and whether the next government will emerge democratically.
Finally, democratic quality means that power is exercised democratically after elections. It consists of six sub-dimensions. First, the elected government`s power must not be unconstitutionally fettered, functionally or geographically.
Functionally, Pakistan`s security policy always resides with the military while donors often exercise undue influence on economic policy. Geographically, parts of Pakistan often become `no-go` for governments while many rural elites maintain their own mini-kingdoms.
Second, the flip side of power not being fettered unconstitutionally is that it should be fettered constitutionally through its distribution. Horizontally, it must be distributed across the executive, legislature, judiciary and political parties.
Vertically, it should be devolved provincially and locally. Shore of considerable power unconstitutionally, Pakistani central executives become reluctant to share further power constitutionally. While the judiciary has succeeded in wresting some constitutional power, other horizontal institutions remain powerless. The 18th Amendment represents the first salvo in achieving provincial autonomy. However, local governments, toothless even earlier, are in limbo presently.
The third requirement is the rule of law, with clear, non-discriminatory laws and an efficient justice system to apply them to public and public officials.
Pakistan still uses many anachronistic British-era laws and has added other laws which discriminate against women and minorities. While the Supreme Court has breathed fire (two-pronged) into the judicial system, lower courts do not provide efficient justice while the police are notoriously corrupt. Finally, public officials escape justice because of NAB`s dis empowerment.
Fourth, elected governments should guarantee civic liberty and equality.
Beyond discriminatory laws, large sections of Pakistan`s population, especially women and minorities, have lost these rights to non-state actors, e.g. militants and landlords. Even elected governments exhibit neither the capacity nor the willingness to redress these usurped rights.
Fifth, real democracy requires policies which enhance economic equity, i.e.
equality of opportunities for all and safety nets for the vulnerable. Beyond populist rhetoric and makeshift programmes, economic policies even under elected Pakistani governments remain elitist, with little attempt to tax the rich adequately and implement socio-economic programmes.
Sixth, real democracy requires vigorous feedback loops from the electorate to the elected in between elections. These loops include electoral mechanisms and civil society activities. Pakistani media has definitely become vigorous lately though not necessarily mature. CNN transformed news from what had hap-pened in the past to what is happening presently through on-time ground coverage. Going one step further, certain Pakistani media outlets have miraculously transformed news into what will happen in the future, through armchair analysis. Consequently, much of their news consists of predictions, e.g., about when the government will fall.
So, it seems strange to blame democracy when Pakistan has never experienced it. Clearly, high democratic quality, as defined above, could help Pakistan resolve many knotty problems, e.g. corruption and poverty. Why has Pakistan struggled to attain real democracy? Some would argue, partly validly, that the frequent interruptions of democracy have undermined its quality.
However, more crucial is the absence of certain societal characteristics, i.e.
high education, incomes, urbanisation and meritocracy. These characteristics foster democratic quality by strengthenine the feedback loops unleashed by civilsociety activities.
These factors, in turn, are facilitated by increasing economic opportunities for common people. While poor governance hampers such opportunities in Pakistan, industrious Pakistanisescape this vicious circle of stagnation by migrating abroad and subsequently sending remittances, which create further opportunities. The process will be slow but such improvised opportunities represent Pakistan`s best chance of attaining real democracy and good governance.
Any mention of the fact that Pakistan`s societal characteristics may not be immediately suitable for real democracy provides fodder to imaginative minds looking forever for alternatives. Martial law has lost charm because of its repeated failures, but a controlled form of presidential democracy where the vast majority is disqualified from not only competing but even voting seems to be the current favourite. This option seems suspiciously similar to Ayub Khan`s failed experiments.
Another favourite in some circles is the `khilafat` option. In Muslim history, righteous khilafat lasted merely a few decades. Which is more likely to emerge in today`s Pakistan? Some people never learn from history it seems. To paraphrase Thatcher`s comment about capitalism, there is no alternative to democracy. While this slogan is certainly not true about capitalism, applied to democracy, there is no escaping from this simple truth. • The writer is a political economist at the University of California, Berkeley.
Friday, November 4, 2011
Higher education, lower incomes G DR PERVEZ TAHIR
The world's financial crisis and macroeconomic dif ficulties have adversely affected funding for education in most countries. Much like in Pakistan, while students are protesting, university spokespersons fear loss of competitive edge in knowledge-driven economies. In the process, some interesting analyses have emerged. Here in Cambridge this week, Haroon Chowdry of the Institute of Fiscal Studies in London made an interesting presentation on the funding crisis in the UK. Proposals like a graduate tax have been mooted.
Escalating costs have raised concerns about the impact on lower income groups. These groups are already underrepresented in universities, something that is very much in evidence in Pakistan. It should be obvious that higher costs would restrict access to higher education for students hailing from low-income groups. However, the presentation found a weak relationship between income and participation rates. Access to higher education is determined by the quality of pre-university education. In other words, if the poor go to bad schools, their grades will be no different.
Our own Higher Education Commission (HEC) lists quality, access and relevance -in that order -as the challenges it must face. While quality and relevance have not moved beyond rhetoric, the focus has been on access. This is not surprising as access is quantitatively defined and is related by the HEC to the physical expansion of universities, which itself is a function of government funding. As physical expansion slows down following deep budgetary cuts by a government repeatedly failing to keep its fiscal deficit within manageable limits, the HEC fears that the present lamentably low access is likely to stagnate or even fall. Access to university education is estimated at 5.1 per cent of the relevant age group. Education Policy 2009 fixes this target at 10 per cent for 2015.
But this policy also wants expenditure on education to go up to 7 per cent of GDP by 2015. If the future is guided by the present, 7 per cent of GDP looks more like the tax-to-GDP ratio of 2015! On average, public expenditure on higher education in countries that are part of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development is one per cent of GDP. The UK is below this average at 0.6 per cent. Poor Pakistan has been spending about half of it.
But whose access is the concern of the HEC? One has not seen any serious analysis. There is a casual mention in the mission statement that the “HEC will improve equitable access through establishing campuses and universities in backward areas, in providing financial assistance to needy students and in introducing soft disciplines, such as social sciences, media and journalism, and fine arts to cater more to the female population so gender parity is further reduced.“ As can be seen, the HEC would achieve equitable access through physical expansion, albeit in backward areas. Physical access is the idea, no matter how backward the university. Interestingly, the HEC wants to improve gender equity by reducing `gender parity'. If this were inattention to detail, calling social sciences, media and fine arts “soft disciplines“ meant for women reminds one of the long discarded `sewing machine' view of gender justice, which stereotypes them, even as it seeks to empower them. The writer, a former chief economist of the Planning Commission, is at present based at Cambridge pervez.tahir@tribune.com.pk
Escalating costs have raised concerns about the impact on lower income groups. These groups are already underrepresented in universities, something that is very much in evidence in Pakistan. It should be obvious that higher costs would restrict access to higher education for students hailing from low-income groups. However, the presentation found a weak relationship between income and participation rates. Access to higher education is determined by the quality of pre-university education. In other words, if the poor go to bad schools, their grades will be no different.
Our own Higher Education Commission (HEC) lists quality, access and relevance -in that order -as the challenges it must face. While quality and relevance have not moved beyond rhetoric, the focus has been on access. This is not surprising as access is quantitatively defined and is related by the HEC to the physical expansion of universities, which itself is a function of government funding. As physical expansion slows down following deep budgetary cuts by a government repeatedly failing to keep its fiscal deficit within manageable limits, the HEC fears that the present lamentably low access is likely to stagnate or even fall. Access to university education is estimated at 5.1 per cent of the relevant age group. Education Policy 2009 fixes this target at 10 per cent for 2015.
But this policy also wants expenditure on education to go up to 7 per cent of GDP by 2015. If the future is guided by the present, 7 per cent of GDP looks more like the tax-to-GDP ratio of 2015! On average, public expenditure on higher education in countries that are part of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development is one per cent of GDP. The UK is below this average at 0.6 per cent. Poor Pakistan has been spending about half of it.
But whose access is the concern of the HEC? One has not seen any serious analysis. There is a casual mention in the mission statement that the “HEC will improve equitable access through establishing campuses and universities in backward areas, in providing financial assistance to needy students and in introducing soft disciplines, such as social sciences, media and journalism, and fine arts to cater more to the female population so gender parity is further reduced.“ As can be seen, the HEC would achieve equitable access through physical expansion, albeit in backward areas. Physical access is the idea, no matter how backward the university. Interestingly, the HEC wants to improve gender equity by reducing `gender parity'. If this were inattention to detail, calling social sciences, media and fine arts “soft disciplines“ meant for women reminds one of the long discarded `sewing machine' view of gender justice, which stereotypes them, even as it seeks to empower them. The writer, a former chief economist of the Planning Commission, is at present based at Cambridge pervez.tahir@tribune.com.pk
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